R (on the application of Bano) v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2026] UKSC22
Bano has its origins in the acceptance of a housing duty on 23 February 2017, concluding just over 9 years later in the supreme court. Central to the case is the question is whether the effect of refusal to accept accommodation is to automatically bring the homelessness duty to an end, or whether notification of the termination of the duty is required.

A recap
The case was in the court of Appeal on 7 February 2025 (Giles’ note here ) proceedings began as an application for permission for judicial review in May 2024 (and Giles’ note here)

Mrs Bano was offered accommodation by Waltham Forest, in Derby, further to an “Offer Letter” dated 11 June 2020.  The letter was headed “offer of accommodation to end main housing duty under s.193 (2) of the Housing Act 1996”.  Waltham Forest had “decided to bring the duty under s.193(2) to an end by arranging an offer of an assured shorthold tenancy in the private sector with a fixed term of twenty-four months.” If Mrs Bano did not attend the property on the appointed day, she would be taken to have refused the accommodation.  Warnings were set out within the letter explained that the local authority considered that the offer of accommodation was suitable, and that the duty would be discharged “whether you accept or refuse the property.”  Further, “the consequences of you accepting or refusing the accommodation is that the Council will no longer be subject to any further duty to you under the homelessness legislation including any duty to provide temporary accommodation”

Solicitors for Mrs Bano maintained that the Offer Letter, following the case of Norton v Haringey (2022) EWCA Civ 1340, did not set out the effect of the Housing Act s.195A(2) and that as such the letter did not effectively end the duty.    Judicial review found that there must be a subsequent decision to end duty, after such a ‘prospective’ letter. The discharge was not ‘automatic’.

Waltham Forest issued an appeal on the basis that there was an alternative remedy to the judicial review which had been issued by Mrs Bano – a statutory review of the termination of the housing duty – and therefore no need for judicial review. The court of appeal considered whether it was possible for Mrs Bano to request a review based on the deficiencies in the Offer Letter.

The Court of Appeal found that s.193A(7) provided an automatic ending of the duty on acceptance or rejection of an offer. The local authority did not need to additionally notify an applicant that it was considered by the local authority that the duty was discharged.  Mrs Bano could have requested a review in relation to the Offer Letter on the basis that s.193 duty ceased.  As there had been an alternative cause of action, judicial review was not appropriate.

Supreme Court
Mrs Bano’s appeal to the supreme court was handed down in July 2026. In addition to the original parties, interveners included Shelter, the Social Housing Law Association and 14 London Boroughs. The case was academic; Mrs Bano and her family had been accommodated by Waltham Forest. The core issue remained the question of the effect of the Offer Letter.

The local authority’s position was that whether Mrs Bano accepted or refused the offer, its duty to secure accommodation for her automatically ceased in the operation of s.193(7AA), and a review could have been requested.

Mrs Bano’s position was that the local authority needed to take a definite decision that she had accepted or refused the accommodation offered and that it accordingly no longer owed her the main housing duty, and moreover that it needed then to notify her of that decision.

The Court considered the effect of s.193(7AA), (7AB), (7AC) (7F) and 8 and noted that for the local authority to make a compliant offer the requirements were

• That the applicant must be informed of the offer in writing,
• The accommodation must be in the definition of a private rented sector accommodation offer with a private landlord and for a fixed term of at least 12 months.
• The offer must explain the consequences of refusing the offer, the right to request a review of suitability of the accommodation, and the explanation of the position if the applicant unintentionally becomes homeless within 2 years.
• Before approving the offer, the local authority must be satisfied that the accommodation is suitable
• The local authority must be satisfied that the applicant is not precluded from acceptance of the offer because of contractual terms to which they are bound.

The court found that parliament had created the statutory review scheme and that to use the judicial review procedure would be to undermine the scheme designed by parliament.

On considering the factual background, the Supreme Court noted that while the Offer Letter was said to inform Mrs Bano of her right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation offered, it did not inform her of the right to request a review of the ending of the main housing duty on the acceptance or refusal of the offer.

The appeal raised the following 3 grounds:

How the main housing duty comes to an end?
Does the main housing duty automatically cease on the acceptance or refusal of a private rented sector offer, OR does the local authority need to take a decision that the applicant has either accepted or refused the offer and the duty has ended AND that this decision should be notified to the applicant?Ordinary statutory interpretation of the words prevailed. The wording expressed that the duty had ceased, and the court contrasted the wording with other sections which operated such that the duty would end when the authority determined, decided or was satisfied of certain conditions.  The court considered the context of s.193(7AA) and its relationship to a right for a review – noting that s.202 envisages that the review right attaches to a decision communicated to the applicant, and that 21 days follow wherein a review may be requested.

It was argued for Mrs Bano that it could not be the case that the housing duty could simply cease without the acceptance or refusal of a part 6 or private rented sector offer, without there having been a decision actively made as to whether the offer was accepted or refused. The analogy of s193(5) was argued. That position was rejected by the supreme court who found that the Offer Letter brought the main housing duty to an end on acceptance or refusal, and the Offer Letter contained the reviewable decision.  It was rejected that the offer letter was merely an indication that the local authority intends to make a decision.

It was submitted that the short timescales for acceptance of the offer led to an absurd result where there could be a good reason for not attending a viewing of a prospective property, but that this failure would result in the discharge of the housing duty. While the court acknowledged that there were often very tight deadlines for acceptance involved, this was in the context of an imperfect system where the Landlord had competing requests for property.  The court reiterated that applicants should accept an offer and then as appropriate challenge the suitability of the offer.

The court concluded that in order for the duty to cease under s.193(7) or (7AA) that the decision had to be notified to the applicant, and if the decision had not been effectively notified then there may be a right to a review – with the necessary discussions about the extension of time under s.202(3).  It was noted by Shelter (intervening) that it is the practice of most local authorities to send a separate letter to applicants informing them of the discharge of the main housing duty.  The court rejected the argument that procedural fairness required notification of a decision to be communicated before it is binding on an applicant. In this case Mrs Bano was notified of the decision and she was able to challenge the decision by way of a review and if necessary to the county court on a point of law.

The clear meaning of section 193(7AA) is that if an applicant (a) accepts a private rented sector offer, or (b) refuses such an offer, then as a matter of law the local housing authority ceases to be subject to the main housing duty.

Was the Offer Letter a decision capable of being reviewed under s.202?
The Offer Letter told Mrs Bano that the main duty would cease to be owed to her upon acceptance or refusal of the accommodation. Although the Offer Letter was not fully compliant with the statutory requirement in s.193(7AB)(c), Mrs Bano did not challenge the decision, as she could have done. Her failure to challenge the decision did not alter the nature that the decision to end the housing duty was capable of being reviewed.

The characterisation of letters sent to Mrs Bano after the Offer Letter.
This ground focused on a letter of 30 October 2020, and the court considered whether that letter was a decision letter which would create a right for a review.  The letter of 30 October was confirmatory of a prior automatic discharge.  The supreme court found that such a confirmatory decision is not reviewable because in their view it would be to undermine the point of s.202(3) in achieving a finality in a case.It was noted that local authorities have wide discretion to extend the period of a review and that to extend time by a confirmatory decision would be to circumnavigate the discretion of a local authority.  The court found that it would not always be possible to identify what was, or was not, a confirmatory letter and that there could be difficulties in distinguishing this from a letter affirming the stance of a local authority.

In conclusion, the Supreme court found that the only letter sent by Waltham Forest in this matter which could trigger a review was the Offer Letter and the other correspondence did not communicate a reviewable decision.  This ground was successful, but that did not affect the outcome as the appeal was dismissed on the first two grounds.

Thoughts
The judgment draws a line in relation to any uncertainty that there may be in decisions where the duty is ended by the making of an offer in the private rented sector.   A review may be brought as to the suitability, or to the discharge of the duty itself, but the route to that is by statutory review at first instance.

A clear distinction is drawn by the court for temporary accommodation under s.193(5) (where the duty can be ended by an offer of accommodation refused by an applicant – provided that the consequence of the refusal is made clear to the applicant and the local authority notifies the applicant that they regard themselves as having discharged the duty). The court found that while there is notification under s.193(5), this is not necessary for s.193(7AA), and the practical distinguishing factor is the former is temporary accommodation and the later the offer of part 6 accommodation or the discharge to the private rented sector. While the wording of each section is different, objectively one wonders as to the full rationale as to why these two decisions should be treated differently. Is it because s.193(5) is only for temporary accommodation within the s.193 duty?

It seems inevitable that there will be applicants who find that the duty has ended – but discover this too late to challenge. Their rights to review are limited only to the 21 days permitted under s.202(3) or extensions as the local authority may be persuaded to give.   Will this become a new source of litigation as to whether the local authority agrees to extend in such circumstances?

The supreme court identified that it would be good practice to have informed Mrs Bano that the right to request a review is not limited to the suitability but that it also extends to the ending of the main duty on the acceptance or refusal of accommodation offered.  This takes us to the notion of prescribed information which sets out all the information that applicants need as to how a decision could be challenged. And this would be positive – ensuring both that the local authority provides comprehensive information as to their offers and decisions made which may be amenable to review, and allowing applicants to know and understand their rights, or to obtain further advice.

Bano reminds us that time is of the essence with all reviews requested, the necessity of getting early advice as to what can be challenged, and the imperative for the applicant to find a housing lawyer to support that process.