(With thanks to Clara Hilger of Landmark Chambers for this note on what must be one of the earliest Ground 1A cases to get before a judge. Her client – perfectly reasonably – did not want their name to live forever in the Google archives, so this is just A Landlord v A Tenant, at the Stratford Housing Centre, some time in the last few weeks)
The Claimant landlord was the executor of his late father’s estate, the majority of which comprised the freehold interest in the property. The tenants had occupied the property since 2010 on two assured shorthold tenancies: one entered into in 2010, and then a renewal in 2024. In the interim they occupied on a statutory period tenancy under section 5 of the 1988 Act. The tenancy was converted into an assured period tenancy by commencement of the Renters’ Rights Act 2025 on 1 May 2026.
Probate was granted in the autumn of 2025. About a week later, the Claimant made a written offer to sell the property to the sitting tenants at market value. The tenants declined that offer. The Claimant subsequently contacted a local estate agent to enquire about marketing the property. The resulting email correspondence detailed the estate agent’s terms, the need to sell with vacant possession, and plans to take photographs to bring the property to market.
Thereafter, the Claimant instructed solicitors to bring proceedings. A valid section 8 notice was served in May 2026 specifying the requisite four-month notice period. The Defendant tenants did not vacate, and possession proceedings were issued in late September.
At the hearing, the tenants declined to defend proceedings. DDJ Lam accepted that there were no procedural defects relating to the form or service of the notice. It had set out Ground 1A in full.
Ground 1A required the Claimant to prove that:
(a) the landlord who is seeking possession intends to sell a freehold or leasehold interest in the dwelling-house or to grant a lease of the dwelling-house for a term certain of more than 21 years which is not terminable before the end of that term by notice given by or to the landlord;
(b) the assured tenancy on which the dwelling-house is let did not come into being by virtue of any provision of Schedule 1 to the Rent Act 1977 or section 4 of the Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976;
(c) either—
(i) the current tenancy began at least 1 year before the relevant date […]
The judge was satisfied as to the requirements in subsections (b) and (c)(i). The Claimant accordingly made submissions as to whether he had proven that he intended to sell the Property. To that end, the Claimant referred to Cunliffe v Goodman [1950] 2 KB 237 and the distinction between “the valley of decision” and “mere contemplation”. It was submitted that the offer to sell to the tenants as well as the sustained engagement with the estate agents, the evidence of which was accompanied by a witness statement, was sufficient to show that the Claimant had “decided” to sell the Property.
The Claimant also referred to S Franses v Cavendish Hotel [2018] UKSC 62 to show that his intention could not be dependent on the tenants voluntarily leaving the property, since tenants who agreed to and eventually purchased the property would by definition remain in occupation, albeit as owner-occupiers rather than as assured tenants. Although there was no authority on the applicability of the Franses “acid test” in the residential context, it was submitted that possession proceedings were only issued to enable a sale on an open market where a private sale to the tenants had not been achieved.
DDJ Lam ordered possession with the following remarks.
This was a new area of law and a new ground of possession, and interpreting its requirements would require judges to look elsewhere. The question was what evidence would be necessarily to establish an intention to sell. Some tenants may maintain that anything short of a confirmed completion date is insufficient to show intention. There would equally be cases where the landlord had not taken any steps towards a sale. In this case, there were steps taken: an offer to sell to the tenants. The correspondence with the estate agents corroborated that intention. It might also be difficult for a sale to progress with tenants in possession, and in those circumstances, it is understandable that a purchaser has not been identified. Further, there is no evidence of a contrary intention.
Analysis
The judge’s remarks raise a continuum of evidence that might be adduced in a claim for possession under Ground 1A. On one end of the scale a landlord might have an identified purchaser and perhaps even a conditional agreement of sale. On the other end you may simply have a witness statement speaking to the landlord’s intention. Evidence of some preparatory steps are likely necessary. The judge placed importance on corroboration: in this case there were two “species” of evidence: the offer to the tenants and the correspondence with the estate agent. Further, there was no evidence of contrary intention. This supposes that tenants who can obtain evidence of a contrary intention may be able to defend a ground 1A possession claim. Equally, it may be enough for tenants to argue that the evidence provided by the landlord does not cross the threshold required to prove a genuine intention to sell.
The offer to sell to the tenants was the linchpin of the landlord’s case here. It raises the possibility that such offers may become a routine way to ward off Franses style defences to Ground 1A. This may have wide ranging consequences: it may become a standard practice, and thus act as an evidential benchmark or minimum threshold for establishing intention to sell. It may also create a tenants’ right of first refusal by the “back door”, even where the statute does not prescribe any such requirement. It is difficult to see how making an offer to sell to sitting tenants at market value would prejudice a landlord genuinely wishing to realise the value of their asset.
No doubt this ground will provoke a patchwork of county court jurisprudence until consideration and authoritative guidance is issued by the appellate courts.
Clara thanks Tessie Belton at Setfords Solicitors for the instruction to appear in this matter, and the landlord for agreeing to let her write about it in this blog.
Thank you for sharing this interesting post on the use of Ground 1a in possession claims