Stonewater Limited v Rosie Marie Harris [2026] EWCC 42

The Claimant Landlord had obtained an injunction ordering the Defendant Tenant to provide access for an electrical inspection. The Tenant had not complied with that order. The Landlord therefore applied to the court to vary the injunction, so that they were “permitted to use reasonable force by drilling the locks to obtain immediate access”, subject to certain conditions.

The application was heard by HHJ Glen. The issue was whether the court had the power to allow the Landlord to force entry using CPR 70.2A(2):

“Subject to paragraph (4), if a mandatory order, an injunction or a judgment or order for the specific performance of a contract is not complied with, the court may direct that the act required to be done may, so far as practicable, be done by another person, being—

(a) the party by whom the order or judgment was obtained….”

Previous cases

Stonewater was the latest in a series of cases addressing the issue of forced access injunctions.

The court’s power to make such orders under CPR 70.2A by DJ Cridge in Southern Housing v Emmanuel (our note). Firstly, he found that landlords had no statutory or common law right to force access. As the CPR could not alter the substantive law, Rule 70.2A could not be used to authorise forced access.  Secondly, Rule 70.2A only allowed the court to direct someone perform “the act required to be done” by the original order. An order that the tenant “allow” the landlord access required the tenant to consent. Forced entry without such consent was a different act, and outside the reach of Rule 70.2A.

A different conclusion was reached by DJ Le Bas in Taylor Clark Ltd v Mohamed (our note) . The landlord did have a right to enter the property: the tenant had provided contractually-binding consent to allow the landlord access. The court was doing no more than giving effect to that consent. As for the act to be done, that was “facilitating” that access. This was an act which could be done by the landlord, by forcing the lock if necessary. CPR 70.2A was applicable.

A similar approach was taken by DJ James in May in Plymouth Community Homes Limited v Hammond [2026] EWCC 27 (no NL note, but judgment available here). The tenant’s right to quiet enjoyment was subject to the landlord’s contractual rights (express and implied) to enter the property as set out in the tenancy. A court order could enforce those terms. As for the act, even if the original order was that the tenant “allow” access to the property, this did not have an element of consent. Court orders were compulsory. The act required was the provision of access. Another party could provide this access, even if not in the same literal way as the original order had envisaged. CPR 70.2A remained effective.

Judgment

HHJ Glen first identified the source of the landlord’s right to enter the property. He did not agree with the ‘deemed consent’ approach of Le Bas in Taylor Clark (which had been adopted by the Claimant). There was a distinction between access clauses and consent clauses. A clause that a tenant would give access under certain conditions did not allow the landlord simply to enter when those conditions were met. That required a properly-drafted clause giving express consent; there was no such clause here.

However, HHJ Glen also disagreed with DJ Cridge’s conclusions in Emmanuel that CPR 70.2A could not be used in absence of such a right. A court could authorise entry into a private home, even without express statutory authority. Search and Imaging orders (formerly Anton Pillar orders) were an illustration of this, although this was “the absolute extremity of the court’s powers” (Lock International plc v. Beswick [1989] 1 WLR 1268).

As a result, the correct approach was that taken by DJ James in Plymouth Community Homes: the focus must be on the act required by the original order. That act was “enabling the landlord to obtain access”. This could be performed by the tenant or, on their default, the landlord. CPR 70.2A could therefore be used to give the landlord permission to force entry. To the extent that this required a purposive interpretation of the rule, it was justified: this was preferable to proceedings for contempt, or a claim for possession, which was “truly an example of taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut“.

However, HHJ Glen noted that such forced entry was a serious interference with a tenant’s property and convention rights. He therefore offered four points of guidance:

1. It is not normally appropriate for the Court, on the first application, to grant a ‘rolled-up’ order for access, including a pre-emptive CPR 70.2A provision in case of default. Instead, a second application should follow if the Defendant does not comply with an initial order.
2. On such an application, the Court should be provided with information on any vulnerabilities of the tenant’s household.
3. Forced entry should require 48 hours notice, and should not proceed in the face of active opposition
4. It is good practice for landlords, after forced entry, to affix a key-safe to the wall of the Property, to assist the tenant’s re-entry.

By postscript, HHJ Glen noted that this issue could be avoided with a properly-drafted clause in the tenancy, giving express consent for the Landlord to enter the property in their absence, subject to certain conditions.

Thoughts

HHJ Glen’s judgment adds weight to the body of cases deciding that CPR 70.2A is sufficient for forced access injunctions. The purposive approach has practical attractions: without it, a landlords’ recourse is proceedings for possession or contempt of court. This is unsatisfactory: from the tenant’s perspective, these approaches are extremely drastic, while landlords will find little comfort in the fact that those slow proceedings have unclear outcomes (particularly given the common mental health element). HHJ Glen’s guidance is also welcome, as standardisation can only help in this unclear area of law.

That said, this is a non-binding county court decision. Although it has the authority of a circuit judge, such authority has existed since Sovereign v Hall (our note https://nearlylegal.co.uk/2024/12/orders-for-forced-entry-after-injunction/ ). District judges can (and do) continue to depart from such judgments. Although Emmanuel increasingly stands alone, it retains a loyal following.

However, it is understood that the issue of forced access injunctions is presently being taken to a higher court. If so, then the authoritative decision invited by so many judges (including DJ Cridge) will soon bring welcome certainty to this turbulent area.