A couple of case notes on County Court judgments, on validity of a s.21 notice, and on whether an introductory tenancy ceased to be so because of an administrative snafu in the filing of an appeal.

Regency Property Management (UK) Ltd v Aleksandrowicz & Anor (2025) EWCC 74

A section 21 notice naming both joint tenants did not have to be served individually on each of them, where a copy had been served validly on the property by it being in the post box in the communal part of an HMO.

However, at the time the section 21 was served, the HMO was unlicensed, and the landlord had not established that the Local Authority had been ‘notified’ under s.73(2)(a) of the reason why the landlord was seeking a temporary exemption notice for that property. (or indeed of the specific property). As such the section 21 notice could not be validly given.

Borough Council of Sandwell v Harris 2025) EWCC 71

This was an appeal within possession proceedings against Ms H, who was originally the introductory tenant of Sandwell. At issue was the effect of section 130 Housing Act 1996 in the context of the particular history of this claim and a previous one.

Section 130 provides (with the court’s emphases):

“130 Effect of beginning proceedings for possession.

(1) This section applies where the landlord has begun proceedings for the possession of a dwelling-house let under an introductory tenancy and—

(a) the trial period ends, or

(b) any of the events specified in section 125(5) occurs (events on which a tenancy ceases to be an introductory tenancy).

(2) Subject to the following provisions, the tenancy remains an introductory tenancy until—

(a) the tenancy comes to an end in accordance with section 127(1A), or

(b) the proceedings are otherwise finally determined.

(3) If any of the events specified in section 125(5)(b) to (d) occurs, the tenancy shall thereupon cease to be an introductory tenancy but—

(a) the landlord (or, as the case may be, the new landlord) may continue the proceedings, and

(b) if he does so, section 127(1A) and (2) (termination by landlord) apply as if the tenancy had remained an introductory tenancy.

(4) Where in accordance with subsection (3) a tenancy ceases to be an introductory tenancy and becomes a secure tenancy, the tenant is not entitled to exercise the right to buy under Part V of the Housing Act 1985 unless and until the proceedings are finally determined on terms such that he is not required to give up possession of the dwelling-house.

(5) For the purposes of this section proceedings shall be treated as finally determined if they are withdrawn or any appeal is abandoned or the time for appealing expires without an appeal being brought.“

Sandwell had extended Ms H introductory tenancy for an additional 12 months, to September 2023. An NTQ was served in January 2023 and proceedings issues in March 2023. That possession claim was dismissed in October 2024 on the basis that the NTQ was invalid.

Sandwell intended to appeal that order. The deadline for an appeal to be filed was 20 November 2024. On 18 November, Sandwell filed an appeal bundle over the counter at the Birmingham District Registry. By a letter dated 21 November, receivec 27 November, the Court office rejected the appeal filing, stating

“The Court is returning your appeal because it needs to be filed on the high court (sic) E-Filing system. Please note that it is mandatory for professional court users to use E-Filing for all high court matters. As this appeal will be out of time when re-filed you will need to apply for an extension of time in Part B of Section 10 and Section 11 of the Appellant’s Notice. We will refund the fee of £285.00 in due course.”

Sandwell did re-file and apply for an extension of time, which was granted. The appeal was refused permission on 7 April 2025, but a couple of days before that, Sandwell had issued a second possession claim on the basis that the tenancy remained an introductory tenancy.

That possession claim was then dismissed on the basis that the introductory tenancy had become a secure tenancy when Sandwell had failed to file the appeal in time in the previous proceedings, because of section 130(5).

Still with me? Good.

Sandwell appealed the dismissal of the possession claim, on the basis that:

i) they had been granted an extension of time to file the appeal; and

ii) they had filed the appeal in time, but the court office had wrongly rejected the filing.

On i) the Circuit Judge held that the extension of time granted on the appeal did not effect a retrospective extension of the prescribed time to file the appeal. It was permission to file late. As such, this did not change the position with regard to s.130(5).

However, on ii), the Circuit Judge found that the then rule in force – the Electronic Working Pilot Scheme PD51O – did not clearly provide that an appeal to the High Court from the County Court must be e-filed. The types of cases listed in §2.2 included Part 7, Part 8 and Part 20 claims, but did not explicitly refer to Part 52 appeals to the High Court.

The senior master’s practice note of 2019 did state that “all claims and appeals issued on and after 17 November 2018 are now managed through CE File and all documents filed are held on CE-File” and this was indeed the usual practice at the Birmingham District Registry. But it could not be said that it was clear that the EWPS did apply to such appeals. PD51O did not expressly take precedent over PD52B on appeals, and PD52B did not mention electronic filing (unlike PD52C for the Court of Appeal).

I am not satisfied that the rules clearly demonstrate that appeals from the County Court to the High Court fall within the scope of the EWPS such that electronic filing using EW was mandatory. In those circumstances, I cannot see that the Claimant can be said to have failed to file an appeal appropriately where it was filed in compliance with Part 52, PD 52B and CPR 2.3(1).

(…)

It is unfortunate that the court staff at Birmingham District Registry treated the filing of the appeal in this case as they did. The Claimant’s appeal papers were lodged at Birmingham District Registry on 18 November 2024, some two days before the CPR 52.12 deadline. I am told that the Claimant’s legal representatives informed the counter staff that the deadline for an appeal was 20 November 2024. If there was to be a refusal to issue the appeal, the Claimant should have been notified immediately or at least in time to be able to remedy the issue. Instead, the Court wrote to the Claimant the day after the expiration of the primary time period for appealing, with that letter being received nearly a week later.

As electronic filing was not clearly compulsory, and it appearing that the court office had erred, the appeal was taken to have been filed in time went handed over the counter on 18 November.

There was then a further issue, by respondents notice.

The defendant argued that the refusal of permission for the first appeal on 7 April 2025 ended the extension of the introductory tenancy by the first proceedings, and that per s.130(1) of HA 1985, an introductory tenancy cold only be extended once.

The Circuit Judge rejected this argument

Section 130(2) of the Act results in an introductory tenancy remaining as such, once possession proceedings have been commenced, until either the order for possession is executed (s. 127(1A) of the Act) or the possession proceedings are finally determined. Given the findings above, this date would have been 7 April 2025.

However, the Claimant issued further possession proceedings on 4 April 2025. At that time, the Defendant still had an introductory tenancy as the other possession proceedings had not been finally determined. As such, the Claimant had to bring any further possession proceedings on the basis of the nature of the tenancy in force at that time (pursuant to ss. 127 and 128 of the Act). When the Claimant served the Notices to Terminate in January 2025 pursuant to s. 128 of the Act, it was entitled to do so as the Defendant still had an introductory tenancy at that time as the introductory tenancy had been extended by virtue of s. 130(2) of the Act until the appeal arising from the original possession proceedings was finally determined by Soole J on 7 April 2025. When the second set of possession proceedings was issued on 4 April 2025, the Defendant still had an introductory tenancy for the same reason. Those proceedings therefore had to be pursued on the basis of the type of tenancy in force, namely an introductory tenancy. I also note s. 130(3) of the Act suggests that, even where an introductory tenancy ends in the circumstances set out therein, ss. 127(1A) and (2) of the Act (termination by landlord) apply as if the tenancy had remained an introductory tenancy.

The possession claim could therefore proceed.