From 27 December 2025, no lease of more than 21 years is capable of being an assured (or assured shorthold) tenancy, as the relevant part of the Renters Rights Act 2025 came into force.

This means that the ‘AST trap’ for long leases with a ground rent that qualified them for AST status has ended (and this post is now thankfully completely outdated).

More significantly, for shared ownership leaseholders, this means that the Housing Act 1988 Schedule 2 grounds of possession are no longer available for use by housing associations/landlords. This means an end to the  Midland Heart v Richardson style cases. The landlord will now have to pursue any alleged breach of lease by the other means available to lessors of long leases, including forfeiture (for the time being), and follow the processes that those require. This is undoubtedly a better position for shared ownership leaseholders in rent arrears, for example, as they will have more opportunities to remedy the position, have relief from forfeiture as a possibility, and won’t face the draconian mandatory possession ground 8.

Spender & Ors v Fit Nominee Ltd & Anor (2025) EWCA Civ 1578

A court of Appeal judgment on whether costs incurred by a landlord under long-term contracts for the hire and maintenance of equipment, including a video door entry system, were “reasonably incurred” within the meaning of s.19 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, so as to be capable of being passed on to tenants as service charges.

The long term contract at issue was for hire of and maintenance of a video door entry system. It had been entered into in July 2000. The leaseholders had challenged the costs for the period 2018-2020 as unreasonably high and not reasonably incurred. They were successful in the FTT, but the UT overturned this.

The Court of Appeal allowed the tenants’ appeal against the UT decision.

While the UT was right that whether it was reasonable to enter a contract at the time it was entered into was a factor, it was not the only one. The nature of the goods or services being provided, the terms of the contract and why the goods or services were being provided on a long term basis also needed consideration.

The UT adopted a correct legal test on reasonableness at the time the contract was entered, but without giving the parties a fair time to address that test, for which neither of them had contended.

In addition, the UT was wrong to say that the tenants had not raised any evidence that the cost of the contract may have been unreasonably incurred, but it was right that the tenants had not put their case on that basis in the FTT.

Neither side had identified the correct legal test. While there may have been material from which the FTT could have found a prima facie case that the costs were unreasonably incurred in 2000, it was not appropriate for it to make a finding that the costs were unreasonably incurred on the basis of the circumstances in 2000, when that was not the case advanced by the Tenants and – for that reason – the Landlords had not sought to adduce evidence in answer. Equally, it was not appropriate for the Judge to reach findings to the opposite effect on the basis of a legal test that she had (rightly) identified but which, because the parties had not advanced it, they had not addressed by way of evidence and submissions.

The matter was remitted to the FTT.

Mentmore Golf Investments Ltd v Gaymer (2025) EWHC 2604 (Ch)

Where a mortgagee applies for relief from forfeiture in a possession claim/forfeiture against the mortgagor’s leasehold title, under section 146(2) and 146(4) of Law of Property Act 1925, it is sufficient that the application is made before a possession order is made, even if a possession order is then made before the application for relief is heard.

(The underlying appeal by the mortgagee was however dismissed as the application for relief was an abuse of process on the facts.)

ARC Time Freehold Income Authorised Fund & Ors v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (2025) EWHC 2751 (Admin)

This is the judicial review brought by a number of freeholder bodies to the Leasehold and Freehold Reform Act 2024 changes to determining the sums a landlord will receive when a tenant under a long lease exercises a statutory right to enfranchise. The freeholders asserted the changes were incompatible with Article 1 of the First Protocol (“A1P1”) to the European Convention of Human Rights.

The judicial review was dismissed.

For all the reasons we have given, we reject the proportionality challenge to the Marriage Value Reform. In summary, there is a robust justification for the Reform which is logically connected to the aims of the legislation, in particular remedying the wasting asset problem and unfairness and imbalance in the relationship between all landlords and tenants falling within the enfranchisement code. There are no less intrusive measures for meeting the aims of the legislation which ought to have been adopted. The Reform does not result in an excessive burden being placed on landlords. A landlord will receive compensation which is reasonably related to the market value of the interest of which he is deprived. A fair and proportionate balance has been struck. The Reform falls within the margin of appreciation that should be accorded to Parliament.

An appeal is being brought.

Sovereign Network Homes v Hakobyan & Others (2025) UKUT 115 (LC)

An appeal on a decision by the FTT to seek further submissions from parties on an issue of contractual liability under the tenants’ leases to pay service charges that the Tribunal had itself raised, as a new issue, early in what was supposed to be a final hearing. The landlord appealed to the Upper Tribunal.

The Upper Tribunal allowed the appeal, but did not accept that it was never right for the FTT to raise a point on its own initiative.

What I take from these three Tribunal decisions is that there can be circumstances in which it is appropriate for the FTT to raise a point on its own initiative. What the FTT should not do is to proceed to decide such a point without giving the parties and, in particular, the party for whom the point is an adverse point, a fair opportunity to put their cases on the point. In terms of identification of the circumstances in which it is appropriate for the FTT to raise a new point on its own initiative, it seems to me that the FTT should be cautious. While this is not an area where there can be a hard and fast rule, it seems to me that what are required, before the FTT should raise a point of its own initiative, are circumstances of the kind described by the Deputy President in Admiralty Park. In particular, it seems to me that the new point should, as a general rule, fall within “the scope of the application, not something which arises outside of it” (Keddie) or, putting the matter another way, should fall within “the broad question” before the FTT (Admiralty Park).

In this case, an issue of contractual liability to pay service charges was not in the statements of case. The tenant applicants were represented. The hearing could not be described as an exploration of the applicants’ case, which was on reasonableness, as it became focussed on the contractual liability issue raised by the Tribunal. The directions given effectively turned the case into the appellant having to plead a case for contractually recovery of the charges.

In view of this

it seems to me that the FTT, in raising the Contractual Liability Issue, stepped outside its arbitral role and effectively took on an inquisitorial or investigative role. As Warby LJ explained in Moustache, at (37), the ET has no general duty to take pro-active steps to prompt some expansion or modification of the case advanced by a party where that might be to their advantage. It seems to me clear, from what was said in Moustache, that the circumstances in which it is appropriate for a tribunal to take pro-active steps to prompt some expansion or modification of the case advanced by a party are also limited, and do not extend to the circumstances of the present case.

(…)

 In the particular circumstances of this case, and for the reasons which I have set out, I am  satisfied that the decision of the FTT to raise the Contractual Liability Issue, was not only wrong, but was a decision which no FTT, properly directing itself and in the exercise of its discretion and judgment, could have made. In my view the FTT should either not have raised the Contractual Liability Issue at all or, having raised the Contractual Liability Issue, should have accepted the argument of Ms Traynor that it was not appropriate to allow the Contractual Liability Issue to be brought into the Application.

Ata v Sinclair (2024) UKUT 423

A notice under section 22 Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 from a tenant to a landlord of intention to apply to the FTT for appointment of a manager does not have to set out in great detail the grounds relied upon in order to be valid. 

In those circumstances the notice did what it was supposed to do. It stated that the landlord was in breach of covenant; and it stated that the breaches of covenant concerned were disrepair and infestation. In other words, the appellant was alerted to the fact that the disrepair and rat infestation of which he was already well aware were among the reasons why the tenants said that he was in breach of his obligations.

Accordingly the notice was not invalidated by failure to set out in enough detail the matters relied upon by the tenants; it said all that it needed to say. To set aside the FTT’s decision on the basis that it did not decide the point would be pointless because the outcome would be the same in any event.