No, this is nothing to do with 30 April or 31 July 2026…

Paragon Asra Housing v Rainford, County Court at Leicester, 25 October 2025 (copy of Judgment here)

This was a County Court appeal of a first instance possession order on the basis of a section 21 notice. Ms Rainford had a ‘starter tenancy’ from Paragon for an initial 12 month term, after which it would become an assured tenancy. Paragon had extended this ‘probationary period’ for a further 6 month fixed term, which was to expire on 25 December 2021. On 5 August 2021, Paragon had served a section 21 notice on Ms R, requiring her to leave on 5 December 2021 (four months notice was required due to Coronavirus regs at the time). Possession proceedings were issued on 25 January 2022 via the accelerated procedure.

I’m not going to go into the somewhat involved history of the first instance possession proceedings, in which Ms R was represented and then at trial apparently not represented, nor the various defences raised. Suffice it to say that a possession order was made in 2023, and that the ground of this appeal was not raised at first instance at all.

HHJ Hedley granted permission to appeal on the basis that there was ‘some other compelling reason’ for the appeal to be heard. It was on a point of law, not requiring new evidence, and Paragon had fully prepared on the point. Most compellingly, there appeared to be no prior authority on the point.

The ground of appeal was this – Paragon’s section 21 notice gave the date after which the tenant was ‘required to leave’ as 5 December 2021, but the fixed term of the tenancy did not end until 25 December 2021. A s.21 notice that gave a date during the fixed term was not valid, on the basis that:

• The section 21 notice was untrue and misleading;
• As a matter of construction, the notice failed to comply with the statutory requirements under section 21 Housing Act 1988;
• The tenancy was subject to public law principles.

The wording of Form 6A, the s.21 notice is

“You are required to leave the below address after: (insert calendar date).  If you do not leave, your landlord may apply to the court for  an order under section 21(1) or (4) of the Housing Act 1988 requiring you to give up possession: (insert address of the property).”

Section 21(1) Housing Act 1988 says, so far as relevant:

(1) Without prejudice to any right of the landlord under an assured shorthold tenancy to recover possession of the dwelling-house let on the tenancy in accordance with Chapter I above, on or after the coming to an end of an assured shorthold tenancy which was a fixed term tenancy, a court shall make an order for possession of the dwelling-house if it is satisfied—

(a) that the assured shorthold tenancy has come to an end and no further assured tenancy (whether shorthold or not) is for the time being in existence, other than an assured shorthold periodic tenancy (whether statutory or not); and

(b) the landlord or, in the case of joint landlords, at least one of them has given to the tenant not less than two months’ notice in writing stating that he requires possession of the dwelling-house.

It was common ground that this was a section 21(1) notice, not a section 21(4) notice. It was also common ground that Paragon could not have begun possession proceedings prior to the end of the fixed term, some 20 days after the date given in the section 21 notice.

HHJ Hedley allowed the appeal.

Adopting a Mannai v Eagle (1997) AC 749 approach to the notice, the question was how the notice would be understood by a reasonable recipient reading it in context. A reasonable recipient would have understood it to mean that Paragon could have begun possession proceedings after 5 December. There was no obvious error, or other information in the notice that would have contradicted that.

The notice therefore did not comply with the statutory requirements, taken purposively. The purpose was both to give the tenant the required notice period, so that they could make arrangements, but also to set out the landlord’s entitlement to seek possession, and as such provide a clear date for the courts on a mandatory possession procedure.

The section 21 notice here did neither, and in particular it did not set out Paragon’s entitlement. As such, it was ‘objectionable’ as per Kennedy LJ in Lower Street Properties Ltd v Jones (1996) 28 HLR 877, and could not found a claim for possession.

There was no practical reason why Paragon could not have put the correct date, when they would have a contractual entitlement to possession.

Appeal allowed and possession claim dismissed

Comment

So there we are, after 37 years (and with only 5 and a bit months to go until it is ended – although not for social landlords), section 21 is still generating new case law. And what is more on a fairly fundamental issue which, astonishingly, has not come up before.

It may be that the reason it has not come up before is that we had all assumed that was the case. That of course a s.21 could not give a ‘leave after’ date that was within the fixed term. But it is indeed the case that for a s.21(1) notice, it is not specified in statute, unlike a s.21(4) notice which date cannot be before the date that a landlord’s notice to quit could have effect, which has long been established as not being within any fixed term, absent breach.

While this is a county court appeal, and so not binding, I think it would be a foolhardy landlord who wanted to argue the opposite case in the dying days of the section 21 notice.

Our thanks to Toby Vanhegan and Ayesha Omar of 4-5 Grays Inn Square for alerting us to this case.