Sorry for the silence, while the cases to write up have piled up. It has been a busy stretch in and out of work…

More thorough write-ups of some cases will follow, but for now, a few brief notes on cases of interest and oddness.

Thanks to Doughty Street Chambers for their note on London Borough of Redbridge v G (Romford County Court, 5 February 2025).

LB Redbridge were buying a property from a private landlord, supposedly with vacant possession. The private landlord did not bring possession proceedings and apparently Redbridge didn’t check vacant possession before completion, with the result that the purchase completed with the tenant in occupation.

Redbridge (somewhat astonishingly) then brought possession proceedings on the basis that the tenant was a trespasser, because the property should have been empty on completion of the purchase.

The tenant got representation and a defence duly filed, that a) the tenant wasn’t a trespasser, and b) was now a secure tenant. as a tenant of the council by way of section 80 and 81 Housing Act 1985.

At first hearing, counsel for Redbridge accepted that this was so (quite rightly) and the claim was discontinued, leaving the tenant in occupation as a secure tenant. To which one can only say, ooops.

In Thanet Lodge, 10 Mapesbury Road, London NW2 4JA. LON/00AE/BSA/2024/0007, the First Tier Tribunal was dealing with applications for a remediation order in respect of fire safety defects to newly added flats on the roof of a pre-existing block. The difficulty was that the freeholder, who was also the developer who had built the flats, was no longer managing the building, as there had been a successful right to manage application.

A remediation order can only be made against a ‘relevant landlord’. S.123(3) Building Safety Act 2019 defines a relevant landlord

In this section “relevant landlord”, in relation to a relevant defect in a relevant building, means a landlord under a lease of the building who is required, under the lease or by virtue of an enactment, to repair or maintain anything relating to the relevant defect.

The trouble here, the FTT held, is that the Right to Manage Company had, by way of section 96 of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002, taken on all of the freeholder’s obligations to repair and maintain.

So the landlord freeholder was not a relevant landlord as not required to maintain or repair. But neither could a remediation order be made against the RTM Company. That had the obligation to maintain and repair, but was not the landlord under the lease.

The proper remedy for the leaseholders, said the FTT, was an application for a remediation contribution order against the freeholder, to fund the works, but o such application had been made here.

Bluestone Mortgages Ltd v Stoute & Anor (2025) EWHC 755 (Ch)

Where, in a mortgage possession claim, there was a debt moratorium (here a Mental Health Crisis Moratorium), could the possession order already obtained be enforced in respect of the non-moratorium debt where the judgment/order related to both noon-moratorium and moratorium debts?

In this appeal, the High Court said no. While a ‘secured debt’ is not a moratorium debt by way of regulation 2 Breathing Space Moratorium and Mental Health Crisis Moratorium) (England and Wales) Regulations 2020/1311, and so the principal sum on the mortgage did not fall under the moratorium, the debt for arrears of mortgage payments/interest was a moratorium debt.

These could not be separated out in terms of the regulations on enforcement. The High Court approved the reasons of the Judge below:

If I go back to the words of the legislation, I cannot avoid the conclusion that a single asset charged to the creditor in respect of both types of debt is “security held in respect of a moratorium debt”, albeit that it is security held in respect of a non-eligible debt as well. The regulation does not say, as it could have done, that it applies only to security held solely in respect of the moratorium debt.

The practical reality is that the security is indivisible. Either a secured creditor takes possession and sells, or it does not. If the sale takes place during the moratorium period, Mr Laville submitted that a creditor in the Claimant’s position would have to apply the proceeds of sale towards discharging the non-eligible debt and to pay a further part of the proceeds, sufficient to discharge the moratorium debt, into a suspense account. If that happened, it would appear to me that the creditor had enforced the security it held in relation to the moratorium debt: the fact that the money realized was in a suspense account rather than the creditor’s account would not change that.

(It is perhaps worth noting, in the context of the actual operation of the Mental Health Crisis moratoriums, that this appeal originated in the fourth such moratorium in a row that one of the defendants had entered, that the debt adviser had refused to revoke it on a regulation 17 request by the claimant, and that it was later cancelled by the Court as ‘materially irregular’, because the defendant was not receiving mental health crisis treatment within the meaning of regulation 28, so was not eligible. Debt Advisers really do need to address the requirements of a ‘mental health crisis moratorium’ properly.)

Simpson, R (On the Application Of) v Brentwood Borough Council (2025) EWHC 462 (Admin)

A failed judicial review permission application concerning the intersection of Part VI and Part VII Housing Act 1996. Ms S is severely disabled, with complex care and health needs. The defendant council had agreed that she needed rehousing on an urgent basis due to the unsuitability of her flat of which they were the landlord. A property was identified for a transfer, once adaptation were complete, under Part VI. This was not initially accepted (though not refused, Ms S refused to view it if the defendant was present) and Ms S’s health deteriorated. The defendant then offered the same property as temporary suitable accommodation under Part VII, with a view to a secure tenancy of the property if it worked for Ms S.

Ms S brought a judicial review claim alleging various breaches of Part VI in the offer. The defendant responded that it was an offer under Part VII.

Ms S sought to argue at the permission hearing that it could not be a Part VII offer as she had not made a homeless application.

Held, following Bury MBC v Gibbons (2010) EWCA Civ 327, the council could, indeed was obliged to, find that a person was eligible, in priority need, not intentionally homeless, but homeless because it was not reasonable for them to remain in their current accommodation from the facts presented in a Part VI housing application. If the facts presented triggered the council’s ‘reason to believe’ under Part VII, the Part VII duties were engaged.

There was no requirement for a formal ‘application as homeless’ by the person, nor a wish on their part to be treated as homeless.

The defendant’s decision and offer was under Part VII.

None of Ms S grounds of judicial review had any prospects of success. Permission was refused and the claim certified as totally without merit.