Taylor Clark Ltd v Mohamed (unreported, Central London County Court, 5 March 2026) (note of case here via Falcon Chambers)
This was a count court hearing, before DJ Le Bas, in which the issue of injunctions to permit the landlord to force access to the tenant’s property was again addressed. It follows on from the judgment of DJ Cridge in Southern Housing v James Emmanuel (2025) EWCC 58 (our note here) that held the Court had no jurisdiction to make such an order. In this case DJ Le Bas held that there was jurisdiction and made such an order. (As usual, it appears that the tenants was not represented and did not appear.)
The landlord argued as follows:
i) The tenant’s obligation under the tenancy agreement was contractually binding consent to the landlord having access in certain circumstances. If the landlord enters in those circumstances, the landlord is not a trespasser. An injunction for forced access, or amend under CPR70.2A to include it, was just giving effect to that binding consent.
ii) A court’s order that the tenant permit access is not an order for the tenant to give permission, but an order for the tenant to facilitate access (by opening the door).
iii) Where the court has made an order that the tenant facilitate access and they do not, they are a disobedient party within the meaning of CPR 70.2A(1) . The discretion under CPR 70.2A(2) to direct that “the act required to be done may, so far as practicable, be done by another person” is therefore available.
iv) The act here is to facilitate access – by opening or unlocking the door. ‘So far as practicable’ extended to permission antoehr person to open the door, by forcing the lack.
This does not amount to asking the Court to use the CPR to overturn existing law.
The court agreed with this and made the order.
Comment
First thing – obviously this issue needs to go to a higher court. Practically, this would probably have to mean a landlord appealing a refusal, and someone applying to intervene (given the unlikelihood of the tenant being represented). We have widely differing views in the County Court on what is, by any measure, a serious issue. This needs to be dealt with.
Secondly, I have doubts about the reasoning in this case. I am not convinced that (pace Southern v Emmanuel) the act required by the original injunction – to let the landlord in – is the same act as forced entry without permission. Forced entry includes damage to the property which is of course not part of a tenant’s access obligations.
One act is the tenant’s contractual obligation, the other act, forced entry, it seems clear to me, isn’t. If it is not, then CPR 70.2A(2) is not available. (Can anyone come up with other breach of contract situations that would allow force in seeking compliance, because I’m struggling.)
There also appears to be no engagement with the common law position in this argument, or judgment. If CPR 70.2A(2) is not available, the whole thing falls apart.