A batch of case notes on homelessness and allocations cases.
RR, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Enfield (2025) EWCA Civ 1390
An appeal to the Court of Appeal of the dismissal of RR’s judicial review challenging Enfield’s allocation scheme as discriminatory, a failure to make reasonable adjustments in RR’s case and a breach of the Public Sector Equality duty.
The issue was that Enfield’s scheme gave 200 points for those owed the homelessness housing duty, but, where other applicants could be awarded 50 or 150 additional points for a low or medium health and well being need, homeless applicants were not eligible for award of those additional points.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The comparison for discrimination was whether the policy put homeless households with a disabled member at a disadvantage to a homeless household without a disabled member. There had been no material before the Judge below to show that disadvantage. New materials relied on by RR did not establish the necessary facts either – that the policy (as a PCP) was making homeless households with a disabled member wait longer than homeless households without a disabled member – as they went rather to the quality of temporary accommodation under Part VII and the impact upon disabled people. In addition waiting time appeared not to because by the policy, but by the shortage of available properties.
The reasonable adjustment sought by RR would run counter to the lawful allocation policy, so there was bound to be a breach of the Council’s duty in meeting them.
The Judge below had, however, been wrong to find a breach of s.149 Equality Act 2010 in that Enfield had failed in its duty to “monitor and record statistics relating to the allocation of housing to disabled households”. The relevant functions Enfield had been exercising were the adoption of the allocation policy and the review of the decision on RR’s points. There had been no breach of the PSED in either regard. Collection of statistical data on the operation of a policy was good practice, but there was no free-standing duty to monitor and record statistics under s.149.
Cifci v London Borough of Sutton (2025) EWCA Civ 1480
A second appeal from a section 204 appeal judgment on the issue of whether Mr Cifci was intentionally homeless. Mr Cifci had been in temporary accommodation provided by Bromley. The landlord ended the lease, but Mr Cifci refused the alternative offer of temporary accommodation put forward by Bromley. Bromley told him that it was discharging its duty, but provided other accommodation for 28 days, as it would usually give those subject to a discharge of duty 28 days to vacate. After the termination of the further accommodation, Mr Cifci applied to Sutton as homeless. This was refused on the basis that he had made himself intentionally homeless in leaving the first accommodation prior to the landlord obtaining a possession order, following Bromley’s discharge of duty.
On second appeal, Mr Cifici argued it was not reasonable for him to continue to occupy the first accommodation. He had been told to vacate it in compliance with the landlord’s notice.
The issue for the Court of Appeal was whether his ceasing to occupy the first accommodation was in consequence of his refusal of the offer of the second accommodation. In Godson v Enfield London Borough Council (2019) EWCA Civ 486 and R v Brent London Borough Council, ex p Awua (1996) 1 AC 55, refusals of temporary accommodation had been held to give rise to intentional homelessness. In this case, the landlord had served notice, but not started possession proceedings. Mr Cifci had only moved out of the first accommodation because of the offer of the third accommodation. However, the cause of this situation was the refusal of the offer of the second accommodation, which was deliberate conduct by Mr Cifci. Appeal dismissed.
Lyrae, R (On the Application Of) v Somerset Council (2025) EWHC 3261 (Admin)
This was a judicial review of Somerset’s refusal to accept a homeless application on the basis that there were no new facts not known when a previous application was refused on the basis that Ms Lyrae was not vulnerable.
In the first application, Ms L has asserted vulnerability a a result of electrohypersensitivity. Somerset had found that she had not established that she was suffering from electrohypersensitivity and no medical evidence specific to her had been provided. This was upheld on review. Ms L applied again, providing two medical reports, including one from a doctor practicing ‘ecological medicine’. Somerset refused the application.
The Admin Court reviewed the case law on ‘new evidence’ and second applications.
The threshold for whether the evidence was ‘significant’ was low, if the evidence is neither fanciful nor trivial, it is significant. If it requires further investigation, then the threshold has been cleared.
“New’’ evidence means new to the local authority, not that is has to have come into the possession of the applicant since the first application. (Subject to any deliberate withholding by the applicant.)
In this case, where Somerset’s first decision was on the basis that Ms L had not established she was suffering from the condition, the decision to refuse the second application was flawed. First, it mischaracterised the previous decision as one that the condition and symptoms did not give rise to vulnerability. Second, there has been an analysis of the medical reports which was not appropriate at that stage, and had misinterpreted the reports. Third, said that the reports did not provide new facts, based upon an interpretation which should not have been carried out that that stage.
The decision was quashed. Somerset must make a new decision as to whether the application was a fresh one.
City of London Corporation v Bussandra (2025) EWCA Civ 1580
An appeal to the Court of Appeal from a successful s.204 appeal. Mr Bussandra had a long history of mental health issues. In 2015 he had served a notice to quit on his housing association tenancy of a flat in Brighton. In 2020, he had applied to City of London as homeless. The Council found that he was intentionally homeless by reason of terminating that housing association tenancy. On s.204 appeal of that decision, Mr B argued that the council’s review officer had erred in finding that his act in terminating the tenancy was a deliberate act, based on his mental state at the time the notice was served. At first instance the Circuit Judge quashed the decision, finding that the review officer had applied to wrong legal test and was wrong to depart from the findings of the mental health practitioner instructed by Mr B. There was also a breach of the Public Sector Equality Duty.
City of London appealed.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. Mr B’s depression and PTSD were considered by the review officer, but he decided they did not cause the decision to give up the housing association flat, nor were there ‘temporary aberrations caused by mental illness’ as a cause. As such it was a deliberate act.
On the relation of mental illness and ‘deliberate’ acts, the Court of Appeal says
In all the circumstances, I have not been persuaded that, for mental illness to render an act or omission non-deliberate, the person must have lacked mental capacity. Neither, however, do I accept Ms Davies’ submission that it suffices that a mental health problem played a significant role in the relevant act or omission. Neither the case law nor the Code seems to me to lend any real support to that view and, as a matter of language, it appears to me that the fact that a mental health problem played a significant role in a decision need not mean that it was not taken “deliberately”. As Mr Hutchings pointed out, were Ms Davies’ contention well-founded anyone who chose not to pay rent or to hand back keys while suffering from mild depression could argue that mental health problems played a significant role and so that the decision was not deliberate. I do not think that conclusion would accord with the “ordinary meaning” of “deliberately”, the Code or the thrust of section 191 of the 1996 Act
Gloria Elsy Rodriguez Robles, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Lewisham (2025) EWHC 2745 (Admin)
A judicial review of Lewisham’s 2022 revised allocation scheme, in particular how it dealt with people in settled but overcrowded accommodation. The previous scheme had placed those one bedroom short of needs in Band 3 (there was no band 4 at the time). The new scheme introduced 4 bands, with those being one bedroom short of needs and statutorily overcrowded in band 3, and those who were in the previous band 3 but not meeting the statutory overcrowding test into band 4. There was the possibility to submit a change in circumstances form for consideration for a higher band, but the new scheme did not say that if successful, the existing ‘band date’ would be changed to the date of that application, with no backdating. Ms Robles, who had been in band 3 was moved to band 4 and told she could submit a change of circumstances form, which she did. Lewisham moved her to band 3 with a band date of 27 December 2022 (her original housing application was May 2021) but then decided this was in error. After representations, the council accepted there was statutory overcrowding and confirmed band 3 with a start date of 27 December 2022 (later changed to October 2022 in view of the Council’s earlier error).
Ms Robles challenged the band date decision, on the basis that it should have been May 2021, as she was band 3 throughout and her circumstances had not changed. Lewisham argued that the scheme was rationally applied and that nothing in it required the earlier band date. The new band 3 was a new criteria and Ms R was actually better offers she was no longer competing with others who needed and extra room but were not statutorily overcrowded.
The judicial review was dismissed. The 2022 scheme was not a continuation of the 2017 scheme and there was nothing in the scheme that required the further backdating of start date. While it would have been better if the new band date on being moved to band 3 had been clearly communicated in the scheme, that did not affect the legality of the scheme.
Ntim v Oxford City Council. County Court at Oxford. 5 December 2025 (Copy of Judgment is here)
A section 204A appeal, following refusal of temporary accommodation pending s.204 appeal.
Mr Ntim had applied to Oxford as homeless. He was appealing a decision that he did not have priority need. Temporary accommodation pending that appeal was refused, and Mr Ntim brought a s.204A appeal of that decision.
The Circuit Judge upheld the appeal, finding that:
i) The Council had not properly addressed the criteria in R v Camden LBC ex parte Mohammed (1998) 30 HLR 315 beyond lip service. The relevant material relating to the merits of the underlying claim were not engaged with, beyond a bare assertion that though the applicant’s appeal may succeed, it was more probable that it would not. That included mention of the new material provided by the applicant, which was irrelevant for this first Mohammed criterion. There was not a proper identification by the review officer of the applicant’s personal circumstances and the likely consequences of a negative decision, under the third Mohammed criterion. The review officer had also taken into account an irrelevant consideration, the shortage of social housing stock in the area, when Part VI and Part VII concerns were distinct and Part VI issues should play no part in the decision.
ii) As there had been no proper consideration of the merits of the appeal, the review officer had also failed in the sharp focus on the applicant’s likely disability “the extent of that disability, the likely effect of the disability if he remained homeless pending appeal, and whether he was as a result vulnerable”, as required by the PSED as per Hotak v Southwark LBC (2015) UKSC 30
The decision was quashed. Temporary accommodation pending appeal was ordered as
“in the circumstances that I have set out in the factual background of this case and relied on by the Appellant in his submissions above, the Appellant will be substantially prejudiced in his ability to pursue the appeal”.