As issues with the use of LLM generative AI in submissions in cases continue to arise, it is perhaps not surprising that the FTT(PC) appears to have had its share of such problems. What is perhaps more surprising is that it seems to have been largely on the part of landlord respondents, rather than leaseholder applicants.
That litigants in person use LLM AI and do not have an adequate understanding of the shortcomings of (any and all) LLM AI models on legal issues should not startle any of us (though they do need to somehow understand the problems). However, professional representatives, even legally qualified ones, doing so raises more of an eyebrow.
It is also worth noting that the severity of the Tribunal’s response to false AI generated submissions appears to be increasing quickly.
My thanks to Matthew Lee of Doughty Street for his excellent site keeping track of UK cases where LLM AI issues have arisen for pointing me at these cases.
Various Leaseholders of Napier House v Assethold Ltd CAM/00KA/LSC/2023/0063 (July 2025)
Ten citations in Respondent’s grounds of appeal were either non-existent or for cases that did not relate to the proposition for which they were cited, one leading to a case about when a Parole Board should have an oral hearing, which was obviously not of immediate relevance. No apparent steps were taken, beyond the dismissal of the appeal.
Holloway v Beckles and Beckles CHI/24UD/LBC/2024/0006 (August 2025)
An application by the landlord for declaration of breach of lease. The leaseholder respondents cited 3 non-existent cases. As a litigant in person, this was taken as non-intentional but the lack of care went to credibility of their evidence. A Rule 13(b) costs award was made for additional costs caused by the fake cases at hearing.
Victoria Place Flats et al v Assethold Limited HAV/00HP/LSC/2024/0523 (October 2025)
A dispute about payment of insurance costs after an RTM had taken over management of the building. The respondent freeholder very nearly found itself debarred due to procedural failings. But on the response that was filed, one case was not on the issue. The Tribunal judge investigated:
Mr Gurvits’ reliance on Qdime in the Response, a decision involving a tripartite management company rather than a RTM company, gave cause for me to consider why he would cite such a case. I typed the following wording without a question mark at the end into Microsoft’s M365 Copilot on an Android device:
Is there case law that a landlord’s right to insure is preserved after the right to manage has been exercised
The AI generated response from M365 Copilot, including replicating the formatting below, was as follows:
Yes, there is case law addressing the issue of a landlord’s right to insure the building after the right to manage (RTM) has been exercised under the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002.
A key case is:
Qdime Ltd v Bath Building (Swindon) Management Company Ltd (fake Court of Appeal citation – NL)
83. 84. 85. 86. 87. Key points from the Judgment:
• The Court of Appeal held that the right to manage does not extinguish the landlord’s right to insure the building if that right is reserved in the lease.
• The RTM company acquires management functions, but does not displace the landlord’s contractual rights under the lease unless those rights are inconsistent with the RTM company’s statutory functions.
• In this case, the lease gave the landlord the right to insure, and the court found that this right remained intact even after the RTM company took over the management functions.
Implications:
• If the lease expressly gives the landlord the right to insure, the right is preserved post-RTM.
• The RTM company may also have a statutory right to insure, but this does not automatically override the landlord’s contractual right unless there is a direct conflict.
The Upper Tribunal decision in Qdime was to the best of my knowledge never subject to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The case reference above concerned the Court of Appeal decision in long running care proceedings.
I then typed the same wording into M365 Copilot on an Android device but adding a question mark at the end which gave a similar response, although the phrasing was markedly different, and it referred to the Upper Tribunal decision cited by Mr Gurvits rather than the ‘hallucinated’ Court of Appeal citation.
Repeating the same question sometime later would not re-produce reference to the Upper Tribunal decision, showing that AI adapts and an earlier answer may no longer be returned as the algorithm learns, demonstrating the care that needs to be taking in using AI. The idiom ‘shifting sands’ comes to mind.
Typing the same wording without the question mark into Microsoft Copilot on a desktop PC returned the following:
Yes, there is case law addressing this issue. The landmark case Qdime Ltd v Bath Building (Swindon) Management Company Ltd (2014) UKUT 0261 (LC) clarified that even after the Right to Manage (RTM) has been exercised under the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002, the landlord retains the right to insure the building if the lease explicitly grants that right.
Typing the same wording later returned reference to another wholly ‘hallucinated’ Court of Appeal decision with a different citation, Qdime Ltd v Bath Building (Swindon) Management Company Ltd (Different fake court of appeal citation – NL)
Inputting that citation into bailii.org does not return any judgment.
On a further cited case, there was an incorrect citation. The actual case did not assist the point relied upon, and had apparently not been read by the respondent.
The Judge concluded AI had been used in the response and not checked.
The Tribunal Judge noted that Mr Ronni Gurvits was admitted as a solicitor, (and ironically enough signed his emails “Ronni Gurvits LL.M”), though not acting as a solicitor in this case, and regularly appeared before the Tribunal. The Judge’s concerns regarding the conduct of this case were raised with the Regional Tribunal Judge.
We have to applaud the Judge’s diligence in trying out Copilot responses to the same question, which were inconsistent, but consistently clear, confident and wrong.
133 Blackstock Road (Hackney) RTM Company Limited v Assethold Limited LON/00AM/LSC/2025/0945 (November 2025)
Another dispute about insurance costs payable to the freeholder after an RTM company had taken over management. The freeholder respondent was debarred from any further participation. The insurance costs were found not payable by the RTM.
The respondent’s response again included Qdime (see above) incorrectly saying it applied to an RTM. It also included a Supreme Court decision which was not an authority for the point on which it was cited, and a Court of Appeal decision which was on a wholly different issue, after originally giving an incorrect citation for that case as an Upper Tribunal decision. Despite the Tribunal’s order, no copies of the authorities were provided.
Judge Latham was concerned that the Respondent had relied on one citation which did not exist and two further decisions which were not authorities for the propositions advanced. He therefore directed the Respondent, by 16.00 on 3 November 2025, to file a witness statement, attested by a statement of truth, addressing why it sought to rely on Gala Unity Ltd v Ariadne Road RTM Co Ltd (fake UT citation – NL), an authority which apparently does not exist. The Respondent was further directed to provide a copy of the authority for its proposition that “where a lease expressly reserves the landlord’s right to insure, that right is not transferred to the RTM company”. In default, Judge Latham ordered that the Respondent would be debarred from defending this application pursuant to rule 9(3)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 (“the Tribunal Rules”).
The respondent did not comply and was debarred.
It was left to the applicant RTM to pursue a rule 13(b) costs application, and for the respondent to explain its failings in its response and provide a ‘reasonable explanation’.
Oxford Hotel Investments Limited v Great Yarmouth Borough Council [2025] UKUT 387 (LC) (November 2025)
This was the appeal that decided that a microwave in a hotel room used for longer term temporary accommodation was not sufficient to amount to separate cooking facilities, and as such the hotel was a licensable HMO. However, within it, was the appellant’s use of AI:
Before turning to that context, I should say that, contrary to Mr Gheewalla’s case, the question is not one which has already been decided by the Tribunal in Barker v Shokar. A written note accompanying Mr Gheewalla’s oral submissions cited that decision and purported to quote at a little length from (18) of the judgment to the effect that a microwave satisfied the statutory definition. The problem is that the real (18) of Barker v Shokar says no such thing. Nor does any other part of the judgment in that case. Mr Gheewalla ended up accepting that this misleading use of authority was the product of AI. It is one which illustrates again, in courts and tribunals, the dangers of using AI for legal research without any checks.
Mr Gheewalla was a director of appellant, in person. It does not appear any further steps were taken.