It has been a while, but today felt like the right time to revive the tradition of the NL Naughty Step, prompted by a First Tier Tribunal decision on a rent repayment order application. This is the decision, Jupet, Dupau & Maschka v Jonathan Krogdahl & Nicky Krogdahl LON/00BK/HMF/2024/0156. Do remember the joint landlord Jonathan Krogdahl, for he is our main character. By the end of this post, you will not forget him.
There is an interesting point of law in the decision, concerning section 44(4) Housing and Planning Act 2016, which reads (so far as relevant)
(4) In determining the amount the tribunal must, in particular, take into account – (a) the conduct of the landlord and the tenant,
Could conduct after the end of the tenancy, and indeed during the RRO tribunal proceedings, be considered as ‘conduct of the landlord’? The Tribunal’s answer was yes, following Kowalek v Hassanein Ltd (2022) EWCA Civ 1041, (our note) in which tenant conduct in accruing rent arrears, but doing so outside the period of the RRO application, was considered. Further, excluding landlord (or indeed tenant) conduct in the RRO proceedings would have required an express exclusion.
As for why the FTT considered this to be a live issue in the case, read on…
Jupet, Dupau and Maschka were the tenants of a flat owned by Ewan Partners Limited (directors and shareholders, Jonathan and Nicky Krogdahl). But the tenancy, for a two year term with a twelve month break clause) named Jonathan and Nicky Krogdahl as landlords and gave their home address, not the company’s registered office. Rent, however, was paid to the company’s bank account. The flat should have been licensed under City of Westminster’s additional licensing scheme, from August 2021. During the relevant period of the tenancy, May 2022 to May 2023, the property was unlicensed. The landlord had licensed in May 2023. The fixed term of the tenncy ended in September 2023, the tenants moved out in October 2023.
The Krogdahls tried to argue that they were not the landlord, the company was. This was not successful, as they were in person on the tenancy agreement, and could have received the rent as disbursements from the company, so both landlord and person having control or managing. There was no issue that the property was unlicensed and should have been, and an argument of reasonable excuse by way of a series of bereavements was not sufficient to amount to a defence.
So an RRO was to be made. The question was the amount. And here section 44(4) came into play. The FTT found no issue in tenant conduct, despite Mr Krogdahl’s accusations (we’re getting there, honestly). So then the issue was landlord conduct.
In what follows, you’ll need to bear in mind two incidents during the tenancy. First, Mr Dupau’s first rent payment had been made (for unclear reasons) to Mr Jupet’s account. Mr Jupet paid it to the company’s account the next day. (So, the company had all the rent). Second, during the tenancy a kitchen light switch had arced and had to be disconnected. The tenants requested a replacement be fitted. Mr Krogdahl sent them a switch but did not arrange for it to be fitted. One of the tenants, an electrical engineer, fitted it. (The safety of the switch was later confirmed in an electrical inspection report that was in the documents provided by the landlord in the proceedings).
During the tenancy, Jonathan Krogdahl had variously:
Given the tenants 2 months notice in May 2023, (after the landlords had become aware that the property should be licensed) while (perhaps foolishly) informing the tenants that the property needed licensing but, he said, couldn’t be in its current arrangement). The notice was of course of no effect.
In subsequent discussions about staying on and a new rent, he characterised an email from the tenants asking for a telephone call to discuss a situation “tricky to navigate for both parties” as being threatening and intimidating.
When the tenants said it would be difficult for them to find new accommodation in time for the revised supposed notice date (no notice was served at the time) of the September end of the fixed term, Mr Kroghdal replied
“…given that you have probably never been in this situation in the UK before, it is worth me highlighting to you the likely steps that will be taken should you choose to stay beyond this contractually agreed end
date, on the 11th September we will:
1. Begin the process of having you formally evicted from the property (Section 8). When we have been forced to run this process in the past, we have been required to prepare a case to present to a county court judge (should it get this far). In doing so, we will collate all documented exchanges and will be requesting character references from your employers in support of our case.” (Tribunal emphasis)
When the tenants asked for notice in proper form – a section 21 notice – Mr Krogdahl replied
“We will begin the process for eviction and will record all of our costs for doing so, which we intend to claim from you even if this process doesn’t proceed to court. Can you each please share the name of your manager to help with character references as we prepare for this eviction process? This will avoid the need for me to call your company’s reception and potentially speak to the wrong people in trying to find out who you report to.” (Tribunal emphasis)
At the Tribunal, Mr Krogdahl tried to argue this was a perfectly normal part of the section 21 possession process. The Tribunal, unsurprisingly, thought this was ‘ridiculously unsupportable’, as indeed it is.
On 13 September 2023, presumably when it became clear that the tenants were (perfectly lawfully) not going to vacate before or at the end of the fixed term, Jonathan Krogdahl wrote to them accusing them of blackmail. He then accused Mr Dupau of fraud over the first rent payment mix up (the rent money that the company had received), and then, astonishingly,
a report of fraud was made by Mr Krogdahl to Mr Dupau’s bankers and an investigation followed that caused considerable difficulty to Mr Dupau in operating his banking facilities for a period, ultimately resolved in his favour by a determination that he had engaged in nothing untoward.
The Tribunal notes Mr Krogdahl’s ‘malicious vindinctiveness’ and proceeds onwards, because oh yes, it can get worse.
The tenants found another property and informed the Krogdahls that they would move out on 17 October 2023. Jonathan Krogdahl, apparently incensed that the tenants (all employed in professional jobs) had found another property without needing a reference from him – one of his previous threats – took steps to track down the identity of the landlord of the new property, told the tenants he thought they had forged a reference from him and implied he would contact the new landlord to confirm this.
At the end of the tenancy, the tenants found that they had overpaid rent in the sum of £830.62. They asked for it to be repaid.
Mr Krogdahl initially refused to refund it, asserting that it might be viewed as a “gratuity for us being fantastic landlords”. After some emails back and forth Mr Krogdahl agreed to refund £633.54 of the overpayment, before unilaterally declaring that he would only refund £337.92, and finally on 7 November 2023 notifying the Applicants by email that the Respondents were no longer willing to refund any monies derived from the overpayment.
So far, so reprehensible. But it was once the tenants had made an application for a rent repayment order that Jonathan Krogdahl went into overdrive.
After being served with the application. Mr Krogdahl sent to the tenants
an invoice in the name of the Company the total sum of £10,620.90 relating to what was by then alleged to have been defective installation of the switch, comprising the (perfectly reasonable, on its face) sum of £150 for an electrician to inspect, £54.94 for the Respondent’s alleged travel expenses, £1,411.04 for the Respondent’s time, at a rate of £156.25 per hour, and £9,004.90 said to be a “Contract Breach Penalty Fee – equivalent to rent loss potential from the time of the breach (3rd Aug ’23) to arrival of new tenants (28th Oct ’23)”
Recall that that the light switch was perfectly fine on the landlords’ own documentary evidence. There was, of course, no basis in the tenancy agreement to levy a ‘contract breach penalty fee’, or the landlord’s time and travel expenses. Nor was there any loss of rent, as the tenants had paid rent up to 17 October 2023 (in fact overpaid, as above).
Not satisfied with one ludricrous and unjustifiable demand, Mr Krogdahl followed this up with
what appears to the Tribunal to be another wholly unjustifiable claim based upon the alleged frustration of a previously uncommunicated desire to sell the Property in 2023, meaning that capital had been unable to be applied to more lucrative projects. The (as we find) wholly unjustified sums sought in relation to the light switch, as augmented by this novel concept, never before articulated, led to a demand from the First Respondent for payment of the total sum of £28,303.87 to the Company.
Somewhat incredibly, Mr Krogdahl then issued county court proceedings for these claims. These apparently are not yet determined and are ongoing, and of course the Tribunal’s findings are not binding on the county court, and of course we don’t comment on ongoing proceedings, but… well, good luck to whoever is making his case at trial.
Mr Krogdahl followed this up with a demand that the RRO application be dropped, as the landlords were
so incensed at the alleged injustice of the tenants’ actions that they propose to use this decision as an example to share with the media, UK real estate agencies and industry bodies to establish a “rogue tenants register”.
This was followed with a threat that a county court judgment against the tenants would mean
“…a flat ‘don’t hire’ for any FCA/PRA regulated positions. Given that you all work in financial and professional services, I just want to make sure that your ‘lawyer’ has advised you accordingly.”
(We’ll come back to Jonathan Krogdahl’s work as an HR consultant below.)
There was also – naturally – a complaint to the police by Mr Krogdahl alleging the tenants had committed blackmail. Unsurprisingly, the police found no criminal conduct whatsoever.
Then, in the RRO proceeding itself
Mr Krogdahl’s ill-judged onslaughts continued to this Tribunal. In the Respondents’ written presentation of their case they unjustifiably alleged fraud against Mr Dupau, in seeking to strike out his claim, and his evidence. They repeatedly, and again entirely unjustifiably alleged blackmail against all Applicants. They variously allege the Applicants to be “devious”, “manipulative”, “falsely pious”
The landlords had also told the tenants (and tribunal) that they had moved to Australia, without giving an address, and they deleted the email addresses previously used to communicate with the tenants, in an apparent effort to avoid service (and then accused the tenants of not serving the application by post as directed.
All in all, the Tribunal found
In this case, the very foundation of the Respondents’ defence, once the issue of them being the landlord was determined, was their slew of allegations of fraud, blackmail, dishonesty and malice against the Applicants. This went further than simple allegations in the present proceedings, to threats to jeopardise their employment, as we find, to unwarranted allegations to Mr Dupau’s bank, engendering a deeply uncomfortable investigation, and at worst a criminal allegation of blackmail made to the police. All of these matters arose from the landlord and tenant relationship between the Applicants and Respondents. These allegations would, if true, constitute serious criminal offences.
On the evidence before us, we have found Mr Krogdahl’s accusations to be false. In these extreme circumstances, we think it would – in Judge Cooke’s words – offend any sense of justice if we did not take this appalling behaviour into account.
The RRO would have been for 50% of rent for a simple failure to license. In view of Mr Krogdahl’s conduct, this was increased to 70% of rent.
Mr Krogdahl then had the cheek to write to the Tribunal to ask it to order the tenants to pay the awards totalling some £25,000 to Shelter. As the Tribunal tartly observes, it has no jurisdiction to do so, and anyway
The Tribunal applies the law as it is, not as Mr Krogdahl might wish it to be, and the state of the law is that an RRO requires repayment of rent to the tenant, not a third party. What the Applicants may choose to do with such sums is entirely their own affair.
So, that is Jonathan Krogdahl, who was landlord of some 5 HMO properties, it appears. Also former Tory councillor on Sevenoaks District Council from 2015, (albeit with a somewhat spotty attendance record). Also former managing director of an HR consultancy specialising in ‘change and transformation’ (that is sacking people).
Also, in the words of the Tribunal, a vexatious, threatening, intimidating, maliciously vindictive bully.
It appears Mr Krogdahl did indeed move to Australia in September 2024. He appeared at the Tribunal by video. It is not clear whether he continues to be a landlord in England. If so, we can only wish the best to his tenants. In the meantime, he goes on the Naughty Step.
