A few brief notes on judgments of interest.
Brown v Ridley & Anor (Rev1) (2025) UKSC 7
The Supreme Court considered para 5(4) to Schedule 6 Land Registration Act 2002 on the requirements for an application for registered title through adverse possession of land adjoining the applicant’s land. This states, as one of the threshold conditions for an application, that:
for at least ten years of the period of adverse possession ending on the date of the application, the applicant (or any predecessor in title) reasonably believed that the land to which the application relates belonged to him, (…)
There were two competing interpretations – A. That the reasonable belief had to be for the 10 years immediately prior to the application, such that an application had to be made immediately that the belief was disabused, or became unreasonable; or B. That the belief had to be for 10 years of adverse possession, but not necessarily the precise 10 years prior to the date of application, such that it was not fatal if the application was not made immediately that the belief ended.
The Supreme Court held, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that version B was correct. There was a requirement for 10 years of reasonable belief in ownership while in adverse possession, but this did not have to be for the 10 years immediately prior the application.
Odhavji v Tighe & Ors (2025) EWHC 372 (Ch)
A rather sad case on an apparent ‘sale and rent back’ agreement. Ms Odhavji was defending a claim for possession brought by Ms Tighe (the claim was dismissed) and counterclaimed that the sale of the property by Ms O to Ms T and the grant of a tenancy to Ms O by Ms T were unenforceable against Ms O as being a sale and rent back arrangement in breach of section 19 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
This was an appeal by Ms O of the dismissal of her counterclaim.
Despite the High Court noting that
It is obvious that the question of whether a sale and rent back arrangement was made is a matter to be determined objectively, on the basis of the pleaded case and the evidence, not on the basis of what the (putative) agreement seller considered that they were entering into or intended to agree. If it were otherwise, an unscrupulous agreement provider (of whom there are, regrettably, many) would only have to mislead the agreement seller, or conceal matters from her, in order to escape the regulatory control and powers that FSMA provides to protect vulnerable individuals.
and finding that the trial judge had been wrong to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that Ms O’s oral evidence (that she did not intend to enter a sale and rent back) contradicted her pleaded case (on the sale and rent back arrangements), the appeal was dismissed.
Ms O’s dealings had been with a Suranjan (Joseph) Cooray and a set up called K & C Properties Ltd. The evidence did not establish that Ms O and Ms T had entered a sale and rent back agreement, because there was not sufficient to tie the representations made by Mr Cooray to Ms Tighe, who had used her own funds to purchase the property (at an undervalue) and granted the tenancy to Ms O, and so a ‘prior agreement’ for sale and rent back under the FSMA
However, the Court notes
Something clearly went wrong for Ms Odhavji and her husband in this matter at the point when she was referred by Mr Cooray to solicitors who would act for her on the transaction, Vincents. They were solicitors known to Mr Cooray. The Judge observed that she did not appear to have much understanding of the transaction on which her solicitors were acting or what they were doing for her. It may be that Vincents only had limited instructions. What those instructions were and who provided them is unclear. The Judge had sight of the conveyancing file and I have not had that advantage. It would be inappropriate therefore for me to say more than that there is an obvious concern about what happened.
Rana & Anor v Assethold Ltd (2025) UKUT 19 (LC)
An appeal to the Upper Tribunal of the FTT’s determination that certain service charges were payable, and refusal of a rule 13 costs application.
The Upper Tribunal restates the principle that
When the FTT’s jurisdiction under section 27A is invoked by leaseholders, they must raise a prima facie case that indicates that a cost was not reasonably incurred, or that an estimated charge was not reasonable. Once they have done so the evidential burden shifts to the landlord to show that the expenditure, or the charge (as the case might be), was reasonable.
In this instance, the leaseholders had raised a clear prima facie case that the disputed costs were not payable under the lease, and/or were not reasonable in amount. The landlord, however, had not filed any evidence as to the payability and reasonableness of the costs. Indeed, the landlord had been debarred, at a late stage, for filing further evidence for breaching Tribunal directions.
The FTT had been wrong in those circumstances to allow the disputed charges as payable and reasonable. There was a clear prima facie case that they weren’t and no countervailing evidence at all.
Further, the FTT had been wrong to refuse the rule 13 costs application.
The landlord had not bothered to comply with the Tribunal’s directions on disclosure and evidence. This failure was inexplicable and unexplained, despite the Tribunal requring the landlord to provide an explanation.
This was unreasonable conduct, whether or not there was an intention to harass the applicants or be vexatious.
The respondent’s conduct caused expense and inconvenience to the appellants, and caused the hearing to be postponed. It was penalised by the debarring order, which meant that any late attempt to make good its default was prevented and the arguments available to it at the hearing were very limited, but the appellants had still had to go through a more protracted and expensive procedure than they would other wise have had to go through. I have no hesitation in saying that a costs order should be made the appellants’ favour.
And, as a final corrective to the FTT, an order requiring the landlord to pay the applicants’ Tribunal fees was made. The FTT said the fees should be reimbursed, but had not ordered it, and without an order, it could not be enforced.