Bano, R (On the Application Of) v London Borough of Waltham Forest (2025) EWCA Civ 92
This was Waltham Forest’s appeal of a judicial review (our note here) which had found that its housing duty to Ms Bano continued because WF had not made a vlid decision to end the duty.
The appeal was on the basis that the Judge below had been wrong to find that Ms Bano did not have an alternative remedy to judicial review, so the claim should not have been allowed. To get to that point, though, the argument was that WF had made valid decisions of which Ms B could have sought a review.
The issue was WF’s letter offering a private sector tenancy in Derby. The offer letter did not set out the effect of Housing Act 1996 section 195A(2). Pursuant to Norton v Haringey (2022) EWCA Civ 1340, Ms B argued and the Judge below accepted that the letter did not function to end duty.
The Judge below also found that there had to be a subsequent decision to end duty, after such a ‘prospective’ letter. The discharge was not ‘automatic’. That decision would be reviewable.
The argument before the Court of Appeal was whether it was possible at the time for Ms B to request a review on the basis of the deficiencies in the offer letter.
The Court of Appeal held:
Ravichandran v Lewisham LBC (2010) EWCA Civ 755 was not authority for the proposition that there had to be a confirmatory decision to discharge duty after a ‘prospective’ decision in an offer letter.
The Court of Appeal did not hold in Ravichandran that the duty of a local housing authority under section 193 of the 1996 Act would not come to an end under section 193(7) unless it decided that the conditions for that had been satisfied but, rather, that a decision to that effect was reviewable under section 202(1)(b) “even if only confirmatory of a prior automatic discharge”. The Court thus recognised that there could have been “prior automatic discharge” and, further, commented that in its unamended form section 193(7) had “provided for automatic cessation, albeit at a later date (i e after notification)”. The Court also referred (in paragraph 35(6)) to the possibility of “a review of the decision of the authority as to the discharge of its duty under section 193(7) by virtue of section 202(1)(b)” “taking place before refusal of the final offer of accommodation”.
Further, the prospective decision was itself potentially subject to section 202 review.
Section 193A(7) provided for automatic ending of duty on acceptance or rejection of an offer. While authorities may often tell applicants that it considered the duty was discharged, this was not a requirement.
But even if this was wrong, Ms B would had the right to review the offer letter, both on suitability of the offer, but also because it was legally deficient (in not setting out the effect of s.195A(2) ) under s.202(1)(b).
It follows, as it appears to me, that Mrs Bano could have requested a review of a decision by the Council that its duty had ceased following Mrs Bano’s refusal of the 11 June 2020 offer. While the Council did not tell Mrs Bano in so many words that it believed its duty under section 193 of the 1996 Act to have come to an end, that was clearly the view it took, and Ravichandran shows that a decision that such a duty has ceased is reviewable “even if only confirmatory of a prior automatic discharge”.
The upshot is that Mrs Bano could have requested a review both in relation to the offer letter of 11 June 2020 and in respect of the Council’s later conclusion that its duty to Mrs Bano under section 193 of the 1996 Act had ceased. In either case, moreover, Mrs Bano could have taken the Norton point on which she now relies. I agree with Mr Mullin, therefore, that Mrs Bano had a remedy other than judicial review available to her.
Ms B had therefore had an alternative remedy to judicial review. There were not ‘pressing’ or ‘exceptional’ circumstances that would mean this case fell outside the general rule that judicial review should be given permission where there was an alternative remedy.
The claim for judicial review was dismissed.