as the Rolling Stones didn’t quite say. In Re 28 Pallant House [2013] UKUT 327 (LC), the Upper Tribunal was faced with an application for permission to appeal out of time. The appellant was the long leaseholder of a flat; LB Southwark was her landlord. There had been an LVT hearing concerning disputed service charges in which Southwark had been mostly successful. The LVT decision was issued on April 20, 2011.
On April 25, 2013 (i.e. almost two years after the LVT decision), the appellant sought permission to appeal. The LVT refused that application, noting that applications for permission to appeal had to be made within 21 days of the date on which the decision was sent to the parties and that no application had been made to extend that time. The LVT noted that it had no power to extend time once the 21 days had passed (note, it was wrong about that, see Grosvenor Estate Belgravia v Adams [2008] RVR 173).
The appellant then sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The appeal application was again filed out of time. Now, the Upper Tribunal does have power to hear applications for permission to appeal out of time, but only if it is in “the interests of justice” to do so (reg.21(6), UT(LC) rules).
The appellant argued that the LVT had not properly informed her of her rights to appeal, and relied on Sch.1 of the Tribunal Procedure (First Tier Tribunal) Rules 2008. The only problem with that was, of course, that those rules didn’t apply to the LVT.
The merits of the underlying appeal was as follows. In a subsequent case involving Southwark (LB Southwark v Woelke), the LVT had found that Southwark hadn’t demanded service charges in accordance with the lease, such that nothing was owing. The appellant in the present case wanted to rely on that decision.
The problem, said the Deputy President of the UT, was that she hadn’t taken this point before the LVT. And she was out of time. And there was a principle of finality in litigation. And the Woelke case had just resulted in Southwark issuing fresh demands (i.e. it had delayed, not extinguished, liability). In short, it was not in the interests of justice to permit the appeal to proceed after such a long delay.