Beach v South Hams District Council (2025) EWCA Civ 609

A second appeal from a section 204 appeal of South Hams’ review decision that Mr Beach was intentionally homeless by not occupying (or not continuing to occupy) a hotel room in Paignton that had been provided as s.193 Housing Act 1996 accommodation.

There is a somewhat complicated back story, but the relevant history as set out by the Court of Appeal is:

The appellant and his wife or partner have six children, the oldest of whom was aged 16 at the material time. The couple separated, and the appellant left the family home. He initially found and paid for accommodation.

On 24 November 2022 the appellant applied to the respondent, seeking accommodation for himself and his children. At that time, all the children were living with their mother, although it appears there was a plan for two of them to live with the appellant at some stage.

On 13 January 2023 the respondent accepted that the appellant was eligible, homeless and had a priority need because he had dependent children who usually lived with him. The respondent therefore accepted an interim duty under s188.

On 27 January 2023 the respondent offered accommodation for the appellant and three children. The appellant declined that offer.

Although no clear account was provided to this court, it appears that there was some form of police involvement with the appellant on or about 21 February 2023. On 22 February the respondent again offered accommodation pursuant to its s188 duty, which the appellant again declined.

On 17 March 2023 the Family Court made a Child Arrangements order which provided for two of the children to reside with the appellant.

On 27 March 2023 the respondent accepted that it owed the appellant a duty under s193(2). The appellant was considered to be in priority need because children would be living with him.

Although the circumstances are again unclear, it appears that on 19 April 2023 the police became involved because the appellant was living with two children and his dog in a shipping container. The children were removed from his care.

The respondent offered accommodation at a Travelodge hotel with effect from 20 April 2023. The appellant occupied that accommodation for one night, but he was considered to be intoxicated when he arrived and the hotel would not extend his stay. It appears that he was not accompanied by a dog when he went to that hotel, and did not say that he needed to have his dog with him.

On 21 April 2023 by phone and email, and on 24 April 2023 by letter, the respondent, pursuant to its main housing duty under s193(2), offered the appellant longer-term accommodation for one adult at the Seascape Hotel. The terms of the booking (which included that the hotel does not permit pets) were both read and emailed to him and the consequences of not using the accommodation were explained to him. Again, he made no mention of needing to have his dog with him.

The letter offering this accommodation stated that the appellant’s children had been removed from his care by the police and were now resident with their mother, and that the accommodation was considered suitable “based on your household needs at the point of presentation”.

The appellant did not take up that accommodation. He emailed the respondent on the evening of 24 April saying that the Seascape Hotel does not allow pets and he had a young dog “who I am very much reliant on for my psychological wellbeing and vice versa”. He said he had therefore secured accommodation for himself at a Travelodge hotel in Paignton. 

South Hams then decided he was intentionally homeless from the hotel accommodation, and this decision was upheld on review (twice) and on section 204 appeal.

The grounds of appeal for the Court of Appeal were

i) that a room in a seaside hotel is not reasonable to continue to occupy; and

ii) that if such a room can generally be reasonable to continue to occupy, it was not on the facts of this case.

At hearing, ground 1 was not really advanced. The Court of Appeal considered this was rightly done, in view of Kyle v Coventry City Council [2023] EWCA Civ 1360 (our note), as the proposition would be

contrary to the case law which clearly establishes that fact-specific decisions are needed as to whether particular accommodation is suitable for a particular applicant and whether it is reasonable for him to continue to occupy that accommodation: see, for example, Hodge and Kyle at paragraphs 49 and 50 above. The reality, as it seems to me, is that the broad proposition, if accepted, would make it impossible for local housing authorities to provide hotel accommodation as even a temporary measure. I see no justification for such an outcome.

I therefore reject the argument that this case should be determined on the basis of a general proposition about hotel (or seaside hotel) accommodation.

A narrower version of ground 1, regarding the availability of the accommodation and whether, on the facts, it was reasonable to remain was effectively the same as ground 2.

On ground 2, Mr B argued that:

South Hams had not provided accommodation that could include Mr B’s two children, as was the situation when offered in view of the Family Court order. The duty included provision of accommodation for all those who would reasonably be expected to reside with Mr B. Therefore the accommodation was not available to Mr B and/or he could not be reasonably expected to remain there. (the relevant date was the April date, not the situation in June 2023 when the Family Court had ordered the two children to reside with the mother.)

The accommodation was even less suitable than B&B accommodation. There were no cooking facilities and rules preventing guests.

The booking of the hotel room was for 5 days, there was no evidence it would be available for at least 56 days.

The Court of Appeal did not accept this.

A person could become intentionally homeless from temporary accommodation. Muse v Brent LBC (2008) EWCA Civ 1447

The manner in which the housing duty could be satisfied changes with changing conditions.

I am in any event satisfied that the correct analysis is that the duty may continue unaltered, but the manner in which the duty can properly be performed may change as circumstances change. I agree with Ms Rowlands that the reality of the situation on 21 and 24 April 2023 was that the children had been removed from the appellant’s care, and the Children’s Services department had informed the respondent that it was their view that the children should remain with their mother. I also agree with Ms Rowlands that the respondent was entitled in those circumstances to offer the accommodation on the basis that the children were safely residing with their mother and did not need temporary accommodation. Even before the Family Court order of 22 June 2023 (which confirmed the reality of that situation), I cannot accept that the respondent was under a duty to expend public funds on providing temporary accommodation suitable not only for the appellant, but also for two children who at that stage could not reasonably be expected to reside with him.

As per Holmes-Moorhouse v Richmond upon Thames LBC (2009) UKHL 7 (our note) there was a difference between the decisions a Family Court may make and those of a local authority on a homeless duty as to whether children can be reasonably expected to reside with the applicant.

As to the other issues raised

I am not persuaded by the other submissions made in support of the appellant’s case on ground 2. Of course, accommodation in a single room, and subject to the restrictions and rules which I have summarised, was far from ideal. But the key points, to which with respect the appellant’s submissions give insufficient weight, are that this was an offer of temporary accommodation, as a step towards longer-term housing; and that, on the evidence, it was accommodation which would remain available to the appellant for as long as it was needed or for as long as it was reasonable for him to continue to occupy it. I accept that the circumstances in Kyle were different from those in the present case; but the factual differences do not affect the principles stated at (42) by Newey LJ (quoted at paragraph 50 above). Although initially booked for a short period, there is no basis for saying that the hotel accommodation could not be extended day by day. The fact that the hotel reserved the right to move the appellant from one room to another seems to me to carry very little weight in support of his case. Still less weight is carried by the surprising complaint that he would have to change rooms after 28 days so that his previous room could be thoroughly cleaned.

Appeal dismissed.