Pierce Glynn acted for them since 2007 to challenge their low priority for housing under Lambeth’s allocation scheme and ultimately assisted them with a complaint to the Commission for Local Administration in England (the LGO) in February 2009.

The LGO indicated in May 2009 that her initial view was that there had been maladministration, that compensation was a likely recommendation and payment of reasonable legal costs would also be considered. She also noted that there was an immediate need for the Adams sisters to be housed in suitable accommodation and Lambeth was asked to consider taking steps to ensure this happened quickly. This they did and the sisters were allocated accommodation in June 2009.

In June 2009 the LGO set out her provisional view in a letter to Pierce Glynn that there had been maladministration including delay by Lambeth. She indicated she would consider it reasonable to expect Lambeth to pay not only compensation to the sisters but also their reasonable legal costs associated with pursuing the complaint with the Council and with the Ombudsman.

There followed some negotiation about reasonable compensation and costs and Pierce Glynn submitted two costs schedules; one at market rates and one at legal aid rates which was for just over £3,000. They pointed out that they had assisted the Adams sisters under the Legal Help Scheme and as such this has been done at a significant loss to the firm. During the following correspondence Pierce Glynn understandably posed the question to the LGO whether her view was that the Adams sisters could ever have pursued the complaint without assistance in light of their health problems and that if her answer to that was in the negative, they invited her to find it reasonable that Lambeth should bear the costs rather than the LSC bearing some and Pierce Glynn having to write off a significant balance.

The LGO replied, somewhat surprisingly given earlier indications, that neither she nor her senior officer were persuaded that it would be reasonable to ask Lambeth to pay the legal costs. In October 2009 with Lambeth having paid the Adams sisters £2000 in compensation as recommended and agreeing to review their procedures, the LGO issued a decision to discontinue the investigation and close the file and that action was the subject for this application for judicial review.  The grounds were largely aimed at disputing the lawfulness of the decision to discontinue the investigation (grounds 1,2,3 and 5) and except for some criticism of the LGO for not issuing a statement of reasons, these were mainly rejected on technical points (those interested in the ability of the LGO to discontinue should refer to paras. 23 onwards in the judgment), however it is ground 4 which is the more concerning.

Ground 4 was a challenge on the failure to recommend payment of Pierce Glynn’s costs. Argument was based upon the power of the Ombudsman contained in s30(1) or s31(2A) of The Local Government Act 1974 to make recommendations “to prevent injustice being caused in the future in consequence of similar maladministration in connection with the exercise of the authority’s administrative functions”. Pierce Glynn pursued the point on the basis that if reasonable legal costs would not be recommended, this would damage the future ability of their firm and others to act for clients such as the Adams sisters who clearly needed the assistance they had received to obtain a just and long overdue outcome.  The Public Law Project was given leave to to intervene in the matter and did so by letter putting forward a case for public authorities whose decisions are overturned, having to pay the costs incurred by the legal aid fund together with a surcharge. The Legal Services Commission also wrote via Pierce Glynn supporting the principle that the fund should be reimbursed by a public body found to be at fault for the expense incurred. Sadly, the judge was having none of it. He found that the costs did not follow the result in the kind of alternative dispute resolution process carried out by the LGO, and that this sort of process should not be ‘judicialised’. The application for JR was dismissed.

Perhaps the most telling remark made by the Judge is found in the penultimate paragraph: “Legal representation is not available in complaints to the Ombudsman. If solicitors take on such work it has to be at Legal Help rates.”  It would seem likely that the ‘if’ mentioned there will just get bigger as a result of this judgment.

This was an application to the Court of Appeal for a stay of eviction pending determination of an application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. The original Court of Appeal decision – Windsor and District Housing Association v Hewitt (2011) CA (Civ Div) 19/05/2011 – we reported on here. The issue was whether Ms H had obtained a transfer to a two bed property by ‘false statement’. The Court of Appeal found that she had. The Court of Appeal’s order gave possession on 30 June 2011. Permission to appeal was refused.

A warrant was issued on 8 July 2011 with an eviction date of 4 August. On 1 August, Ms H applied to the Court of Appeal for a stay of eviction, heard on 3 August by Mummery LJ (not one of the original appeal judges).

The delay in making the application following the making of the possession order on 19 May was a major factor in the decision, albeit that Ms H had been granted an extension of time to file application for permission by the Supreme Court (until 26 August).

Ms H argued that the reason for the delay was that a) Ms H’s original solicitors had lost their legal aid franchise shortly after the May hearing and that b) the limitation her funding certificate did not cover an application for stay and application for permission to the Supreme Court and that the LSC had not reached a decision on amending the certificate until 28 July 2011, at which point the stay application was made.

Before amendment, the limitation was “Representation of the respondent on an appeal to the Court of Appeal up to and including the final hearing of the appeal.”

However, Mummery LJ found that:

In my view, the public funding at that stage clearly covered an application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court, which was refused by the Court of Appeal, and in my view it would also have included an application for stay of the possession order pending the determination by the Supreme Court of any petition for permission to appeal and, if that petition was granted, until the final disposition of the appeal. Those sort of applications are made every day in this court when somebody wants to appeal a decision that has disappointed them.

The amended limitation included ‘application for a stay of execution and to petition the Supreme Court for permission to appeal and prosecute the appeal if successful’. However, while this clearly covered the application, Mummery LJ remained of the view that the original limitation would cover the stay application and application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court, apparently in reliance on those words ‘up to final hearing of the appeal’.

This was significant, because Mummery LJ found that the delay was unjustified. Although Ms H faced eviction and the point of her appeal would admittedly be defeated if the eviction went ahead, it would not be stayed. Application dismissed.

Also worth noting is that while Ms H had argued there was no prejudice to the Housing Association in a stay as the rent was being paid, the Housing Association had argued that there was prejudice in that it had demand for two bed flats from people who ‘really’ needed them. Mummery LJ accepted the Housing Association’s argument.

On the funding certificate limitation point, it would be very likely that the LSC would have agreed with Ms H’s solicitors, rather than with the view taken by Mummery LJ – that the Court of Appeal decision marked the ‘final disposition’ of the appeal as funded. So it may be well be of use to point to this decision, where that limitation is held to cover a stay application and application for permission to appeal further.

Ms H, whose appeal apparently included a Ladd v Marshall argument on new evidence that her son was indeed living with her as well as argument on the interpretation of ground 17 Housing Act 1988, we must presume has now been evicted – unless the Housing Association elected to hold fire pending the permission application. Anyone have any news on this?

And what does it mean? Pretty much exactly what the initial proposals set out. Oh and the LSC is to be abolished. The MoJ will take legal aid funding decisions in house, with no prospect of possible conflicts of interest at all. Honest.

Welfare benefits and debt to be out of scope (save for debt threatening homelessness), education out of scope save for SEN children, clinical negligence out of scope. Family did see an amendment on the definition of domestic violence but otherwise remains much the same in scope as the proposals, but I’ll leave the detail on that to the Family specialists. Ditto Immigration, much of which falls out of scope.

For housing, there is some small relief. Unlawful eviction is to be within scope (but not claims for trespass to goods, land or person, so ruling out the alternative heads of claim for aggravated unlawful eviction).

Homelessness appears to be fully within scope from the stage of being ‘threatened with homelessness’. However, there is no legal aid for trespassers facing possession and although not in the bill, the criminalisation of trespass was announced by Cameron.

Added back into scope are defending orders for sale against the client’s home (but not charging orders) or bankruptcy proceedings where the bankrupt’s estate includes a home.

Where benefit issues lead to arrears and a threat of possession or homelessness, representation will be available for the possession or homelessness matter, but not for any benefit tribunal proceedings even if those are directly concerned with the arrears problem. This is because benefit tribunals are a complete walk in the park that any person facing possession proceedings can negotiate with their eyes closed.

Possession proceedings generally against non-trespassers remain in scope. Judicial review remains within scope (apart from public interest/third party claims – which is what happens when you embarrass the Ministry of Defence).

Disrepair remains in scope for those facing a risk of “serious harm to the health and safety of an individual”. Interestingly, the harm may be temporary and health includes physical and mental health. Futher (at para 75 of the consultation response), it is acknowledged that some investigation of a case may be required to establish risk:

legal aid will be granted where there is a credible allegation that there is a serious risk to the safety or health of the individual or their family. This will mean that legal aid will be available for the early stages of such cases to enable the merits of the claim to be investigated. Where a disrepair is found not to pose a serious risk, further funding will not be available.

However, many disrepair claims will be out of scope. For those looking to Conditional Fee Agreements to bridge that funding gap, recoverability of success fees and after the event insurance premiums from the losing defendant is to be ended. Success fees are to be set out as a percentage of damages received and subject to a maximum of 25%. But nothing in the one way costs shifting is proposed (yet) for disrepair claims, unlike Judicial Review. So prospective claimants face either their solicitor taking a cut of their damages if they win or the risk of costs liability to the defendant landlord should they lose.

Damages-only disrepair claims are likely to become a thing of the past shortly in any event in view of the dramatic increase in the small claims limit to £15,000 or £25,000 proposed in the County court reform consultation, on which more another time.

It is worth noting that any legal aid funded claims will face a 25% deduction from damages for the legal aid fund, despite all legal aid costs being repaid to the fund in these circumstances. This appears to encompass disrepair, unlawful eviction or any other funded claim attracting damages.

A new addition to scope are claims ‘relating to a contravention of the Equality Act 2010′  in relation to housing.

Out of scope are claims for nuisance, negligence and breach of statutory duty and all other matters not mentioned as being in scope above (TOLATA claims, harassment claims, breach of quiet enjoyment etc. etc.)

The housing related clauses on scope are at Schedule 1 s.27 onwards but must be read with the exclusions in Schedules 2 & 3.

The consultation response also makes for interesting reading, not least because it reveals the immediate plans for the telephone gateway, proposed as the sole point of access to legal advice in legal aid matters. Before we get there, we should note that the MoJ acknowledges that it had a very large volume of responses and that ‘the large majority’ of the responses opposed some or all of the proposals. Their response – a prolonged raspberry.

For example, Legal Action Group have done a breakdown of what will be lost in matter starts and funding by Borough and County, which can be found on the Guardian here. It makes for grim reading (my Borough takes a 62% percent hit, others are worse).  However, the Impact Assessment [pdf] attached to the consultation response states, at 31:

there might be a loss of business for some legal services providers which are contracted with the LSC to provide legally aided services. [Really? What an unexpected surprise! NL]

there might be an increase in business for other service providers, including perhaps alternative resolution service providers or services which support self-resolution, which are funded by people who previously received legal aid.

And if this air of hopeful, nay positively wilful self-delusion was not enough, it adds at 33:

The overall impact on providers would also depend upon individual providers’ reliance on income from legally aided clients and how they adjust to changing patterns of demand. For example, if providers are able to cut costs and identify other efficiencies, or if providers are able to move into other business areas, the impact on them would be lessened. As identified above, we lack clear evidence on how current providers are likely to respond to the cuts in legal aid.

Well, I think one can have an educated guess at some of the likely responses. Providers folding up their tents, substantial numbers of redundancies, etc. etc.

Anyway, on to the telephone gateway and a further example of the casual imbecility that pervades the bill and the consultation response.

The MoJ intend to press on with the telephone gateway as the sole means of accessing legal aided advice or representation, but initially trialling it by way of the CLA phone line becoming the sole means of access to advice and assistance for the following:

• debt (insofar as it remains in scope);
• Special Educational Needs cases;
• discrimination cases (claims relating to a contravention of the Equality Act 2010);
• community care.

Let us pause there for a moment. If you recall, the only debt matters that remain within scope are where someone is facing the loss of their home. In fact, where there are imminent or actual proceedings. Where, one might think, there was a crying need for urgent advice and, well, representation in the case. But no – off to the phone line to work their way through two layers of ‘phone advice’ these people must go, with no guarantee that they will ever actually be referred to local representation and assuming their debt is adjudged to be suitably threatening to their home.

And it remains the plan to extend this nonsense to all civil areas remaining in scope, after this ‘trial’.

(Don’t even get me started on the quality of CLA phone advice. A colleague has just had a case referred by the CLA where possession proceedings had started. Turned out the CLA had been ‘assisting’ the client with massive disrepair – she couldn’t even live in the property, hence the rent arrears – by pursuing the Council’s complaints process, not just for weeks but for months without effect. The CLA hadn’t even advised the client that there was such a thing as a disrepair claim, let alone tried to refer on. Words, for once, failed me. Not just really bad advice but it actively made the client’s position worse. I blame lack of training and qualified supervision, obviously. A situation that can only improve with large scale expansion on tightened funding.)

But it is clear for whom the bill tolls most loudly. As the impact assessment notes, 600,000 people will lose advice, assistance and representation, (there will apparently be a 10,000 increase in mediation clients, which makes it all better). That is 600,000 of the most vulnerable, marginalised, desperate individuals, without the financial resources or often the personal skills to deal with the problems facing them by themselves.

The impact assessment, at 26, says:

As a result of this reduction in resource transfers, clients who no longer receive legal aid may choose address their disputes in different ways. They may seek alternative resolution services, may represent themselves in court, may seek to resolve issues by themselves without reference to the courts, may pay for services which support self-resolution, or may decide not to tackle the issue at all.

There is evidence that all these different approaches are sometimes undertaken currently by people facing disputes.  Although the evidence is inconclusive, there is a risk that outcomes may be worse for some people who no longer receive legal aid as a result of these proposals.

And that is pretty much it on the extent of the impact on clients, apart from noting that there is very  limited evidence on the relative improvement in the position of legally aided people over those without representation or litigants in person.

The impact of this bill and the associated proposals on civil legal aid providers will be varied. Some will be OK, others – and probably the majority – will not be OK at all.

But we should be absolutely clear that this bill is a knowing, deliberate removal of assistance and representation from some of the least well off – both financially and socially – in the country and those least able to fight back politically. As any provider can attest, it is massively – if indirectly – discriminatory against women, ethnic minorities, the disabled and those on low income or subsistence benefits. (Tellingly, the Equality Impact Assessment [pdf] takes the approach of setting out the  ’justification of potential adverse impacts’, presumably laying the ground of defence to any challenge).

It is also, of course, going to cost every taxpayer considerably more than it is going to save them in the short term in the costs of unresolved problems. But those won’t come out of the MoJ budget, so let the damage fall where it may.

So, does the bill go through in its current form?

I’ve done what I can to fillet out its significance for housing and social welfare provision, cutting out the various justifications, excuses and statements of purpose. The following are the proposals on which consultation is to take place.

Scope:
Housing – to remain in scope are:

• homelessness, at least at s.204 appeal (the document is silent on help at s.184 or s.202 stages).
• possession claims (tenancy and mortgage)
• disrepair counterclaims to possession claims
• “serious housing disrepair cases where the litigant is not primarily seeking damages, but is seeking a repair of such significance that without it the life or health of the litigant or their family may be at serious risk (such as the repair of gas equipment)”
• defending ASB proceedings

Out of scope:

• ‘non serious’ disrepair [4.78 and then the following at 4.194)
• an action to enforce a Right to Buy;
• an action to enforce a Right to Buy a freehold or extend the lease;
• actions to set aside a legal charge (for example, a mortgage) or the transfer of a property;
• actions for damages and/or an injunction for unauthorised change of use of premises;
• an action under the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996;
• applications for a new tenancy under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954;
• an action for re-housing;
• an action under the Access to Neighbouring Land Act 1992;
• an action for wrongful breach of quiet enjoyment;
• housing disrepair proceedings where the primary remedy sought is damages, including damages for personal injury;
• an action for trespass; or
• an action under the Mobile Homes Act 1983 which does not concern eviction.
• nuisance claims (4.239)

Legal Aid will be refused where some other form of funding, like a CFA, is available. (4.265)

Unlawful eviction isn’t mentioned at all. I would presume injunction for re-entry would be in scope but a damages only claim would not be, by a process of analogy.

Other SWL:

Out of Scope:

• Debt where there is no immediate risk of homelessness
• Welfare Benefits to first tier tribunal appeal
• Employment – none at all.

In scope

• Judicial Review – for all except business purposes.

Interesting to note that the excuse throughout is the availability of voluntary sector advice and assistance for non-life threatening issues. For housing, Shelter and CAB are flagged up as the fitting alternative to legal aid funding. I wonder how they feel about that?

Access
At 4.272, we find:

We propose that, in future, we will provide a simple, straightforward telephone service, based on the current Community Legal Advice (CLA) helpline (first established nationally in 2004). This advice service will be able to refer clients to the source of advice most appropriate to them, and will act as a reliable onestop shop for clients looking for legal advice. The CLA helpline will be established as the single gateway to civil legal aid services. All clients will be able to access the first tier of the service (the Operator Service) while the second tier will offer specialist advice to eligible clients in all categories of law within the scope of civil legal aid. In the vast majority of cases this will mean that clients will make their initial contact to access civil legal aid services through the Operator Service, rather than through a face to face provider. However the services will be designed to minimise the risk that clients with emergency cases experience delay in accessing the help they need.

Can that mean what it appears to mean? No direct approach from clients? And a further layer of phone advice before any referral to a face to face provider?

And there is to be a paid-for phone advice service.

Eligibility (Chapter 5):
Passporting for Income Support, ESA, income based JSA, pension credit to end. Capital to be taken into account at the same rate as non passported (currently limited to up to £8000)
The formerly passported with disposable capital over £8000 will have to make a contribution.
Any client with over £1000 in disposable capital to pay a one off £100 contribution, over monthly contributions, to be collected by the legal aid practice and set against payments by the LSC
Over £3100, payment of £1 of capital for each £1 over, up to £8000.

Property value to be considered -
Non contested property cases
Pensioner disregard of £100,000 abolished.
Equity disregard of £100,000 scrapped.
Mortgage disregard extended to full value of mortgage, subject to a ceiling of £200,000 gross property value, or £300,000 for a pensioner with disposable income below £315 per month. Mortgage disregard limited to one property only.

Contested property cases
Equity disregard of £100,000 scrapped
‘Subject matter of dispute’ disregard at £100,000
Mortgage disregard extended to full value of mortgage, up to a limit of gross value of £500,000

Income contributions
Maximum contribution level raised to 30% of disposable income between £315 – £733 per month, up from 20% maximum at present. Two options provided, one tapered, one not.

Fees

An across the board cut of 10% in civil legal aid rates. Enhancements capped at 50% for County Court, or 100% for High Court and above.

Barrister rates to be codified as follows:
Hourly rate

• Junior counsel in county court £108.00
• Senior counsel alone or leading in High Court £135.00
• Led junior counsel in High Court or Court of Appeal £112.50
• Leading senior counsel in Court of Appeal £157.50
• Queen’s Counsel (where approved for instruction by rate (-10%) LSC) in the High Court or Court of Appeal £180.00
• Leading senior counsel in the Supreme Court £180.00
• Queen’s Counsel (where approved for instruction by LSC) in Supreme Court £225.00
• Noter/Pupil/2nd led junior counsel £36.00

In cases where there is a good chance of a costs award, payment in the event of being unsuccessful (or in the interim?) will be at ‘risk rates’: “where costs will be recoverable in the event of the claim succeeding, lawyers are paid at ‘risk rates’: £70 per hour for solicitors; £50 per hour for junior barristers; and £90 per hour for senior barristers, without general enhancements.”(7.15). This will apply from a post ‘investigatory help’ stage, rather than the £25K VHCC limit as now (or post permission in Judicial Review).

Expert fees – Surveyors etc. £50 per hour and proposals for fixed fees for reports and court attendances. (Annex H and J)

And finally
As a parting gift, price competitive tendering some way down the line for all.

Comment
This is all intertwined with the Consultation on the Jackson Report, also out today. What this will end up doing to CFA arrangements, or indeed fixed costs in fast track cases, will clearly have an impact on some cases proposed to go out of scope.

First thoughts…

It is a good thing that homelessness and possession have, to some extent at least, been recognised as priority concerns, and one would hope that some obvious idiocies like phone only access will get lost in the wash, but this is going to present some very large problems. I hate to have to roll out the ‘access to justice’ line once more, but someone hasn’t done their market modelling in thinking this through.

If this happens, it is going to have a very significant impact on firms and organisations that followed the LSC’s urging to become holistic social welfare law providers in the last round. In a complete reversal of direction, only (some) housing would remain in scope. Big problems for some, not least those following the ‘paralegal factory’ model of practice.

That 10% cut in fees across the board is going to be very hard for some, I’m thinking about some law centres and NFPs that have remained on a knife edge of viability since fixed fees came in.

And then there are the unclear bits. Is homeless assistance to be restricted to s,204 appeals? These are all that is mentioned. So no assistance with applications or s.202 review submissions? How is one to determine life threatening disrepair without an expert’s report (and funding for it)?

The proposals for telephone access and referral only are, let’s be honest, bonkers. Street homeless, for example? How are the most vulnerable left within scope to know of this magical number?

At a tangent, both CABx and Shelter are used as a fig leaf throughout as ‘voluntary sector’ organisations which people can access for ‘non-urgent’ advice and assistance. I’m not sure what either organisation will make of that – not only being asked to bear that weight, but also given their rôle in provision of legal aid Social Welfare Law work – particularly under the new contracts that started today (15 Nov). That sounds suspiciously like a double hit for them – a bigger burden in the ‘voluntary’ side and withdrawal from scope of much of the SWL provision funded. But this proposal will be tough for every provider.

Coming next – time and sanity permitting – the Jackson proposals costs consultation.

All welcome, although I understand from having attended these things before that preference is given to MPs and Peers and once the room is full, no-one else can get in.

However, there is another judicial review claim by an unsuccessful firm, Davies Gore Lomax of Leeds. The hearing is listed for 27 October.

The claim is apparently on the grounds that:

The point for having 10 upper tribunal appeal cases was irrational (the same argument advanced by CLP in their settled proceedings)

The points for having an approved intermediary for debt at the time of the bid were unfair when “the LSC said in its consultation response last summer that we did not need to have one in place until six months after the start of the contract.” The requirement to have the intermediary in place at the time of the bid to gain maximum points was sprung on bidders. “The person we chose to be an intermediary was on maternity leave until July. She qualified on Friday last week, in time for the original start date of the contracts on 14 October.”

If the challenge goes ahead and is successful, then the implications for the lawfulness of the SWL tender process are clear. Solicitors Journal story here.

The JR was won on the issue of the significance given to panel memberships and the notification of that significance only. The wider argument on the equality duty and a failure to undertake a sufficient impact assessment wasn’t decided upon.

The LSC had raised delay as an issue, arguing that the publication of the criteria was the relevant point. The Court found that the proper date was the release of the results, but if that were wrong, they would have granted the Law Society an extension of time on grounds of wider public interest. The basis for the finding on the relevant date was that neither the LSC nor the Law Society were in possession of the relevant facts – the impact of the selection criteria – until the results were known. It is less clear if individual firms could rely on this principle, or whether they may be stuck with publication of the criteria as relevant date, given that their challenge would not be on a broad public interest basis like the Law Soc.
(Contrast with Collins J’s approach to the delay argument in the preliminary hearing of the CLP JR on firms being entitled to expect that contract awards would be handled with consideration of quality and some exercise of discretion. Perhaps not an argument one would want to test to full hearing…)

Law Soc got costs and Claimant. Interveners bore their own.

The decision was that the family law tender – including the family/housing combo – was unlawful. Details of remedy not clear, but the broad agreement was that current family contracts will continue until X. Where X is truly unknown.

LSC given permission to appeal.

This freeze apparently includes current housing contracts for those who bid for family/housing combos. BUT the new SWL contracts will go ahead (after the months delay).

So, as far as I can tell, this means that some people will be doing housing under the new SWL contracts, with matter starts based on the LSC’s revised procurement area figures, while others will be doing housing under the old contract – as extended – with, I take it, the same matter start allocation as before. I get the strong suspicion the figures won’t add up.

Those firms who lost out in SWL are still out, but I wonder what happens to anyone who was doing family and housing but made an unsuccessful SWL bid ?

And the poor firms in family who were taking on new staff and premises as a requirement for their expanded matter starts. That has yet to play itself out. Quite possibly in the courts.

It will all end in tears. Again.

Update:
Law Gazette report

Solicitors Journal report

Who bets on current contracts extended till April 2011 while Ken readies his axe?

COMMUNITY LAW PARTNERSHIP AWARDED SOCIAL WELFARE CONTRACT

On 21st July the Legal Services Commission (LSC) informed us that we had failed to obtain a Social Welfare Law (SWL) contract to start on 14th October 2010. Since SWL is all we do this would have meant the end of the firm. We were refused a contract because we lost one point on one criterion in the tender process – the tribunals criterion.

Our appeal to the LSC was rejected. Therefore, we continued with our judicial review challenge that we had already lodged. The Law Society failed to back our court challenge despite a personal plea to Law Society President, Linda Lee.

On 2nd September the Law Society Gazette reported the initial hearing before Collins J where he stated: “I am bound to say this is a dreadful decision and on the face of it the approach [taken by the LSC] is totally irrational.”

The hearing was adjourned to 8th September. On 6th September the LSC stated that, after a verification process, they were offering us a contract which will allow us to continue with our work. We are delighted with this news. In these circumstances the court action has been settled.

We would like to thank all those who have provided us with letters and messages of support in this process – this support has been vital in enabling us to continue our fight. We would like to pay tribute to the barristers who have assisted us in our challenge: Marc Willers of Garden Court; Zia Nabi of 1 Pump Court; and David Lock of No 5 Chambers.

Above all we would like to thank and pay tribute to the loyal and dedicated CLP staff who have stuck with the partners through this most stressful process. We look forward to continuing to provide an excellent service to the homeless, others in housing need, and those with benefits and debt problems in the West Midlands and to Gypsies and Travellers nationwide for a long time to come.

Chris Johnson, Rosaleen Kilbane and Michael McIlvaney