Archive for the 'Assured Shorthold tenancy' Category

Period? Which Period?

Suvini v Anderson, Staines County Court, 13 August 2010

It is well known that notices under section 21(4)(a) of the Housing Act 1988 must give notice to a tenant that “after a date specified … being the last day of a period of the tenancy … possession of the dwelling-house is required”. This is an issue that has been before appellate Courts a surprising number of times. Most notably in MacDonald v Fernandez [2003] EWCA Civ 1219.

In Church Commissioners v Meya [2006] EWCA Civ 821, the Court of Appeal made a close reading of section 5 of the Act and held that it should be construed as reading that the periods of a statutory periodic tenancy created by that section “are the same as [the periods] for which rent was last payable under the fixed term tenancy.” In short, then, if I pay the rent under the fixed term quarterly then once the tenancy becomes periodic by way of s5 the periods remain quarterly, irrespective as to how rent was then paid. This leaves open two key questions:

  1. What happens if the tenancy becomes periodic by way of contract and section 5 is not involved? and
  2. What happens if the rent payment day is changed during the fixed term? Does this alter the start and finish dates of the periods of the tenancy when the tenancy becomes periodic?

The first question will have to await another day because it was the second of these questions that came before DJ Batcup in Staines.

In this case S had let a property to A from 18th August 2007 to 17th August 2008 with a rent of £1,200 payable on the 15th August 2007 and 15th January 2008. A further tenancy was granted for another 12 months from 18th August 2008 to 17th August 2009, rent being payable bi-monthly in advance starting on the 11th August 2008. After August 2008 the tenancy continued on a periodic basis. A notice under section 21(4)(a) was served on 1 April 2010 seeking possession “after 17 June 2010 or, if later, the day on which a complete period of your tenancy expires next after the end of two months from the service of this notice.”

Basically if the periods of the tenancy were as set out in the tenancy agreement then possession should be given whereas if it was accepted by the Court that the start and finish dates of the periods had been changed by the changed payment provision then the notice would have to rely on its saving provision and could not therefore expire until 10 August. Proceedings were issued before 10 August and so this position would be fatal to possession proceedings.

Ultimately DJ Batcup came down on the side of ruling the notice valid and awarded possession.

This case actually raises a serious question as to what a period actually means. Following DJ Batcup’s view there is an indirect correlation between the payment dates and periods. In other words a periodic tenancy can run from period to period without there being a presumption that rent is due at the start of the period for that period. This is hard to credit and certainly runs counter to the usual rule at common law. The reasoning also runs counter to that of the Court of Appeal in Tadema Holdings v Ferguson where it was held that an agreed change in payment dates did change the periods of the tenancy for the purposes of a s13 rent increase notice. However, in Church Commissioners the Court expressly rejected the idea of a “symmetry between the statutory provision and the common law rule” when considering the length of a period.

We understand that this matter has been appealed to a Circuit Judge so there will be a further installment at a later date.

With thanks to James Browne of Lamb Chambers

On the Naughty Step – drop the dead donkey redux

There is very hot competition among the cast of this sorry episode for being placed on the step. This is also a story which has already been commented on by Tessa Shepperson of Landlord Law, who indeed played a small – and entirely virtuous – part. But Tessa is basically a nice, fair-minded person, and for that reason, her posts are entirely free of bile. I, on the other hand, am not necessarily nice, and rarely lacking in bile to spare.

For a taster of what is to come, here is the first foray of Suzy Butler into the media – the local paper. Note the ‘squatter’ motif, although the local paper does at least have the limited presence of mind to put the term in quote marks.

Then there is this:

Let us pause here to note that Ms Nobre was given an assured shorthold tenancy, paid what appears to be in the order of 6 months rent in advance and remained the tenant of the property, probably on a statutory periodic tenancy. Let us also note that, although facts are hard to discern in the fog of Ms Butler’s variable accounts of events, her father is reported to be a property developer and professional landlord.

GMTV returned to villify the tenant some more a day or so later. By this time, amazingly, Ms Butler isn’t in the tent anymore.

Unsurprisingly, the tenant gave up in the face of some serious media vilification and moved out. Naturally, Ms Butler had cameras on hand for her return.

So, who goes on the step?

Ms Butler is undoubtedly one of the dimmest of accidental landlords. Here, for example is a screen capture apparently from a BBC South East news item of what is apparently the ‘notice’ she served on the tenant (click for bigger).

defective notice screencap

And in fact, from documents that were shown in a BBC South East news programme on 10 August, it appears that she gave an ‘extended agreement’ to Ms Ombre on 25 May 2010, up to 5 August 2010. This suggests that the ‘notice’ above, dated 28 July was sent after a first missed rent payment in July and Ms Butler’s appearance, with a tent, in the local paper on 7 August stating that ‘she had to wait for two months missed rent to serve notice, which had been done the day before’ was immediately after a second missed rent payment on 6 August. Which makes the whole ‘tenant supposed to leave in April when Ms Butler returned’ story deeply suspect. Ms Butler is very welcome to clarify (as indeed is Ms Nobre).

But of course she is far from alone in saying “I can’t understand how I can have no right to enter the home I bought”, when it is not her home but a property she has let to someone else. Her petulant rage and self pity at actually having to obey the law are deeply unappealing, but again, hardly unusual. What is more unusual is that Ms Butler is not only prepared to court the media to implicitly announce to the world that her own stupidity means that it is unfair that the tenant is accorded legal rights against her, but has decided to actively campaign on the basis of the moral correctness of her own lazy ignorance. (Perhaps unsurprisingly, that Facebook page has apparently repeatedly deleted comments vaguely critical of Ms Butler’s stance on the basis that it is, well, against the law and she has behaved unlawfully – on which more below) [Edit 21/8. Someone had put a link to this post on that Facebook page. That has now been deleted by the page Admin].

In a final display of dimwittedness, Ms Butler and her supporters have announced they will be taking their campaign to Parliament, with her local MP – Mike Weatherly – but this is on 24 August, when Parliament is still in recess. Top lobbying work there. (Mr Weatherly can be contacted via here, should anyone feel he needs a spot of housing law explained to him).

And then there is GMTV, allegedly a news organisation, at least whose output is classed as such for the purposes of regulation. Their reporter repeatedly and utterly wrongly describes the tenant as a squatter, sympathises with Ms Butler when she says that the ‘squatter’ doesn’t answer the door to her when she goes to the house, apparently without notice, except once when she went with the police (showing their usual standards in L&T issues) and who then – with Ms Butler – turns up at the property unnannounced and demands to know why the tenant is still there. After standing by as the camera delightedly films Ms Butler petulantly ranting at the tenant inside the house, the reporter then demands to know when the tenant will leave.

And, frankly, that tent was so obviously put up for the camera that it screams out in full ‘Drop the dead donkey‘ bloodstained-cuddly-toy-abandoned-in-disaster-zone style.

In the follow up GMTV section, one anchor (Sally Smedley to a tee) asks, in tones of incredulity, ‘why can’t the landlord turn up with the police, or turn the electricity off, as so many viewers have emailed to say they should do this?’. When the barrister guest explains that this is a criminal offence, the other anchor, astonished, says ‘even though it is your house?’ (The barrister, Philip Rainey QC, is not as clear as could be wished for on the question about homelessness and council rehousing, to be honest, but then Tanfield Chambers aren’t noted for their expertise in homelessness. If only GMTV had asked about leasehold enfranchisement… But he otherwise does pretty well indeed in the face of some ridiculous posturing from the anchors).

So, this is a ‘news organisation’ that, on the sole basis of a (youngish blonde) dodgy amateur landlord’s flaky, unquestioned and unsupported story, is prepared to label a lawful tenant a ‘squatter’, doorstep the the tenant together with the landlord, comprising a breach of quiet enjoyment – at the very least – and demand that the tenant tell them when she will leave the property. All the while failing to give the tenant any chance to reply and talking over and cutting out her attempts to respond. The behaviour of the anchors, being also presumably directed and partially scripted, can also be laid at the door of the ‘news organisation’ rather than the only other conclusion – that they are personally spectacularly dim and ill informed, which is never a good look for a ‘journalist’. In short, this is a ‘news organisation’ that was prepared to expend its resources in support of a landlord’s attempt to force the departure of her tenant without getting a court order through the public vilification of the tenant. And that does not bother to carry out even the most cursory checks of a) the facts and b) the law before broadcasting – on two separate occasions – their utterly wrong story.

Naughty Step badgeFor that reason, however unattractive a figure Ms Butler may be – and just watch that scene of her shouting at the tenant while in the house from the first video again if you need reminding of how cynical her behaviour has been – it has to be GMTV that end up on the naughty step. Other media organisations swallowed Ms Butler’s ‘squatter’ line whole. Only GMTV actually went round themselves to harrass the tenant on camera and demand she explain why she was still there. Broadcasting Standards Commission, anyone?

And for today’s game of offences, what kind of claims can we arguably see made against Ms Butler and/or GMTV?

Against Ms Butler:
Breach of quiet enjoyment, obviously.
I’d throw in breach of Protection From Harassment Act – two or more occurrences of behaviour that D knew or a reasonable person would consider likely to harass. Butler had clearly on her own account been to the property shouting and demanding entrance on a number of occasions, then turns up with the police, then with a GMTV crew who record her shouting at length at the tenant.

Protection from Eviction Act? – I’d have a shot at that. Acts likely to interfere with peace or comfort of occupier – even just telling the media the address and that the property was ‘squatted’ could have been enough, but turning up with GMTV so that she and the reporter could have a go at the tenant for not leaving? Pretty certain. Then follows ‘knows or has reasonable cause to believe that conduct is likely to cause the occupier to give up occupation..’. Ms Butler has said this was why she went to the media – to ‘speed the process up’.

Housing Act 1988 s.27? I’m a bit less sure about this. How far can the GMTV and other media be held to have acting been at Butler’s instigation or on her behalf, or even directly in consequence of her acts?

Against GMTV? – over to you all…

[Thanks to some of the posters here for links to videos etc.]

[Edit 20 August: that last link to a thread at the MSE forums has been deleted by the admins. Not clear why. There are a lot of annoyed people at the MSE forums discussing that deletion of the thread. The suggestion is that the PR person running Ms Butler's Facebook campaign page objected to being identified. [Edit 08/09/2010. Mr Dumore has contacted me. He asserts that the MSE thread was taken down because it contained personal information about it and, he alleges, threats to him]. That would be Jeremy Dunmore. Mr Dunmore’s twitter page gives as his personal website link a blog by the ‘Ascender Group’. Mr Dumore’s twitter account has many tweets about the Butler ‘campaign’. Mr Dunmore’s public entry on linkedin [just removed, link to cached version] states he is “Founder and Managing Director of Ascender Group“:

we are an innovator in outsourced business development and marketing services structured around an SGO model our aim is to build long term strategic relationships with our clients and deliver bottom line growth enabling us to grow and prosper alongside our customers [sic]

Here is their thoroughly professional blog. Been a bit quiet lately, lately being 2010.

The company website at www.ascendergroup.co.uk (as formerly inked to from his twitter page and linkedin page) doesn’t exist, which is the kind of consummate attention to detail I look for in someone ‘interested in consulting offers and expertise requests’.]

[Edit 21/08/2010. I've filed a complaint with Ofcom on the GMTV reports - detail in the comments below. Any updates will be passed on].

New Tenancy Deposit Cases in Legal Action

Our new copy of Legal Action flopped onto the mat here at Nearly Legal Towers this morning. Looking at the reported cases a pair of tenancy deposit matters caught my eye. One of these we have already written about here.

In Baafi v Mapp, Central London County Court, 24 June 2010 a landlord had sought a possession order on the basis of a section 21 notice. The tenant defended the claim on the basis that the landlord had not properly complied with the requirements of the Housing (Tenancy Deposits) (Prescribed Information) Order 2007, he also counter-claimed for the now-customary penalties. The landlord had registered the deposit with the MyDeposits scheme and provided the tenant with their standard form of certificate. This certificate contains a paragraph making clear that the MyDeposits certificate does not, on its own, supply all the information required by the Order. Specifically, it fails to notify the tenant of the procedure to be followed where the landlord or agent cannot be contacted after the end of the tenancy and also fails to inform the tenant of the circumstances under which the landlord will make deductions from the tenancy deposit. Normally, MyDeposits would expect these matters to be dealt with in the tenancy agreement. The landlord was using an agreement which was describe as “archaic” and which failed to address the items missing from the certificate. Surprisingly at first instance DJ Gerlis applied something he described as a ‘purposive approach’. He took the view that as the deposit had been protected the lack of all the prescribed information was not that important. He therefore awarded possession and dismissed the tenant’s claim. On appeal HHJ McMullen QC held that a purposive approach was not required as the statutory framework was clear. He also found that had a purposive approach been required he would have found that the purpose of the regulations was the proper protection of the tenant’s deposit which was not going to occur when the tenant had not been provided with information as to what would happen if the landlord disappeared. Possession order set aside and counter-claim allowed.

It is worrying that some judges are still prepared to exercise some form of ‘discretion’ in a matter where it simply does not exist.

HMOs and Council Tax

Goremsandu, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Harrow [2010] EWHC 1873 (Admin)

As many of you will know the definition of an HMO for the purposes of Council Tax is totally different from that used in the Housing Act 2004 (and in relation to planning uses classes). It is, however, an important definition because where a property is an HMO the Council Tax (Liability for Owners) Regulations 1992 require that the owner is the person who has the primary liability to pay the Council Tax, even if they then pass on that charge to the tenants.

In this case G owned a property with a conservatory which she had let to four tenants from October 1999. Crucially the tenants were on a single tenancy agreement and were jointly and severally liable for breaches. After a series of renewals the tenancies came to an end in December 2007 with the tenants finally vacated in February 2008 after holding over as periodic tenants for a short time. The property had been let furnished but the tenants did not wish to use the furniture and had, by agreement with G, placed it into the conservatory. This basically rendered the conservatory unusable. Towards the end of the occupation G built a new two-room extension to the property which joined it by way of the conservatory. This was completed shortly before the tenants moved out and G had apparently moved into the extension about 2 weeks before vacant possession was given up by the tenants. It seems that the tenants had not paid the entirety of their Council tax and London Borough of Harrow (LBH) then sought to recover the outstanding sums along with bailiff’s fees from G, a figure in excess of £11,000. She took the matter to the London (North West) Valuation Tribunal who gave a decision dated 23 June 2009. This decision was then appealed to the High Court.

The case for LBH and the decision if the Tribunal turned on their interpretation of regulation 2 Council Tax (Liability for Owners) Regulations 1992. This states:

The following are the classes of chargeable dwellings prescribed for the purposes of section 8(1) of the of section 8(1) of the [LGFA]-
Houses in multiple occupation, etc
Class C a dwelling which
(a) was originally constructed or subsequently adapted for occupation by persons who do not constitute a single household; or
(b) is inhabited by a person who, or by two or more persons each of whom either-
(1) is a tenant of, or has a licence to occupy, part only of the dwelling; or
(2) has a licence to occupy, but is not liable (whether alone or jointly with other persons) to pay rent or a licence fee in respect of the dwelling as a whole.

The Tribunal found as facts that each tenant was liable to pay their rent separately to G and also that she had restricted access to the conservatory. They did so primarily on the basis of evidence submitted by the tenant’s through LBH. They discounted the tenancy agreements which were expressed to be in the name’s of all the tenants. The Tribunal also found that G had restricted access to the conservatory. Based on these findings the Tribunal found that the property was an HMO for the purposes of Council tax and the money was payable.

The High Court criticised the basis on which the Tribunal had approached this matter. The starting point for their investigation should have been the tenancy agreements the parties had entered into. The statements by the tenants referring to paying their ‘shares’ of the tenancy simply expressed the fact that the rent for the property was shared among them. It did not undermine the agreement itself and the right of the landlord to hold them jointly and severally liable for the rent. It also did not mean that the tenants did not enjoy full access to the property.

With regard to the conservatory the evidence showed that the tenants retained a right of access to it and that it was filled with the landlord’s furniture because of their choice, albeit with the landlord’s consent.

By failing to give effect to the tenancy agreements the tribunal had applied the law incorrectly. They had also applied the test in the regulations incorrectly. The Tribunal had taken the view that individual rent charges equated to an HMO whereas the test in the regulations was whether “the rent charges gave rise to a licence whereby they only occupied part only of the dwelling or whether they were paid in respect of part only of the dwelling.” On the facts the individual rent charges, in so far as they existed, were paid to allow access to the whole of the dwelling and so the decision by the Tribunal was incorrect.

Appeal allowed.

All mimsy were the borogoves

The Jabberwock of the tenancy deposit scheme came whiffling again, in the tulgey wood of Northampton County Court. This time it was the clause that catch to beware of. And there’s a disrepair claim in there too.

Paula O’Brien v Jacqueline Jones & Andrew Alexander (T/A Belvoir Huntingdon). Claim No 9KG00335 12/02/2010 [On Lawtel for some reason]

Ms O’B (hereafter B) was the assured shorthold tenant of Ms J (hereafter J), whose managing agent was Mr A (T/A BH) (hereafter ‘the agent’). The tenancy was ended by agreement on 19 December 2008. B had withheld the last two months rent due to her concerns about the condition of the property.

At the time of hearing, and after some amended pleadings, the position was that B claimed against J under s.11 Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 for disrepair. B claimed against J and the agent for an order under s.214(3) Housing Act 2004 for the deposit of £950 and the 3 x payment. J counterclaimed for the last two months rent, which was not opposed by B, save for a set off.

No dispute was raised by J or the agent as to whether the deposit was returnable, save for a set off against the rent claim. The Agent also conceded that any order under s.214(3) could be against landlord and agent (although the Court took the view that such liability for the agent was far from clear).

The deposit was protected with The Dispute Service and had been protected by the agent within 14 days of receipt.

What was at issue and formed the basis of B’s claim under s.214 was that the information provided by the landlord did not meet the requirements of s.213(5); and/or that the landlord had not complied with the initial requirements of The Dispute Service under s.213(3).

Under s.213(5), B argued that the landlord had failed to provide a personal address and telephone number under the prescribed information. The landlord had provided an address and phone number in the tenancy agreement, pursuant to s.48 Landlord and Tenant Act 1987. The address was the agent’s address. B argued that the Housing (Tenancy Deposits)(Prescribed Information) Order 2007 required a personal address for the landlord. The landlord had in fact provided a personal address before B made her application, and, in agreement with HHJ Bullimore in Harvey v Bamforth (our report here), there is no breach where the prescribed information is provided after 14 days but before and application was made by the tenant. But in any event, it was not found that a failure to provide a personal address rather than an agent’s or business address was a breach. The Order did not provide that it must be a residential address if that is different to an address for notice and service under s.48(1) L&T 1987.

Under s.213(3), B argued that the tenancy agreement did not comply with the initial requirements of the TDS scheme in that the TDS required their ‘members’ to include certain specified clauses (the ‘G Clauses’) and these were not in her tenancy agreement.

J and the agent argued that including the clauses, or the information they contained, in other documentation was sufficient. B had had the tenancy agreement, inventory, prescribed information and a leaflet called ‘What is the Tenancy Deposit Scheme’, (this leaflet was unfortunately not in the evidence). B had also requested from TDS the content of the G Clauses and had been provided with them by TDS.

The Court found that the information that had been provided was also to be provided under the TDS initial requirements, so seemed unlikely to by itself remedy the lack of the G Clauses. The provisions on the G Clauses in the TDS rules of membership were clear – the clauses were to be included in the tenancy agreement and their wording was not to be changed or amended. TDS had apparently confirmed in correspondence with J and the agent that they considered that the tenancy agreement was in breach of their conditions, although they did protect the deposit. It was not clear, as argued by J and the agent, that the issue was a mere technicality and didn’t prejudice B, as the G Clauses did contain significant information and further, the TDS had stated that due to the breach, their arbitration service would not be available.

S.214(2) was engaged. Contrary to the argument of J and the agent that the words ‘as the court thinks fit’ in s.214(3) meant a discretion as to whether to make any order at all, the only alternatives were to order return or protection of the deposit. The deposit had been registered, but could not be dealt with under the TDS dispute resolution scheme. Ordering the return of the deposit was the only viable option. Having made such an order under s.214(3) an order for the 3 x penalty must be made under s.214(4) – so the order was for a payment of £3,800 to B.

On the disrepair, the items complained of that engaged s.11 Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 and that had caused loss of enjoyment and inconvenience were:

  • Rising damp to one wall of the dining room with raised wallpaper and some damp spotting, sufficiently serious to require remedial action. Complained of in August 2008, should have been remedied by October 2008 at the latest, so damages for a period of two months, albeit that the inconvenience was relatively minor.
  • No hot water due to a defective boiler following a leak. The boiler was off for a week and should have been repaired within 4 days, so damages for the remaining 3 days.
  • Kitchen floor, damaged in the boiler leak. Part of the kitchen floor was removed and not replaced in early October 2008. J and the agent argued that the delay in repairing was due to difficulties with the insurers, who would not authorise works for over a month. This was not a valid reason for delay. It was not reasonable to wait for the insurers to deal with the claim. Damages for a period of 7 weeks.
  • Kitchen door – the frame was pushed out of the wall by the expanding floor boards due to the boiler leak, leaving a gap between frame and wall. There were no drafts or water penetration, so the inconvenience was solely not being able to use the door, which was a minor inconvenience as there was another door to the garden. 7 weeks damages.
  • Boiler and wiring left exposed after works. J’s enjoyment affected as she had to take care to ensure the safety of her children while in the kitchen.
  • Boiler debris and loose decking. Boiler parts were left on the outside decking and a piece of decking had been left out of place. Both were at best minor inconveniences. The boiler parts could have been moved by B.

All together, damages for disrepair assessed at £500. Rent was £950 per month and the longest period of damages – the damp – was two months.

The remainder of the items claimed by B were either not capable of being disrepair under s.11, had not been reported and/or had caused no inconvenience.

The set off of £1700 in unpaid rent against the awards to the tenant had been agreed by the parties.

Comment
Apart from the disrepair claim being an illustration of how tenants tend to routinely over value claims – B’s view was the withholding the last two months rent was an appropriate recompense for her inconvenience – this is an interesting (although County Court DJ and non-binding) decision on the meaning of ‘complying with the initial requirements of the scheme’. While Harvey v Bamforth on late compliance in providing the prescribed information is expressly agreed with, it appears in this case that a breach of a Scheme’s requirements for something like the terms of a tenancy agreement could fall foul of ‘the initial requirements of the scheme’ and be non-remediable at a later point.

However, how such a breach is to be discovered is another matter. B’s evidence, entirely reasonably, was that she was unaware that there had been such a breach. Unless the other documentation provided to the tenant sets out the requirements of the Scheme for its members, or the required inclusions such as the G Clauses here, how is the tenant to realise that there has been a breach, unless or until the Scheme refuses to provide the arbitration? B apparently discovered the omission only at the end of the tenancy when she approached the TDS about their dispute resolution scheme, only to be told that the omission meant TDS could not deal with the dispute.

In short, what this looks like raising is a form of breach with is both irremediable by the landlord and unlikely to be discovered by the tenant until the Scheme refuses to provide arbitration services – at or after the end of the tenancy. So, yet another Jubjub bird to beware of in the Housing Act 2004 provisions, or is it a frumious Bandersnatch to shun?

(I do wonder why the landlord didn’t simply return the deposit in full and then seek to argue that no order under s.214(3) could be made, so no award under s.214(4), but perhaps the TDS would not allow that once proceedings had begun.)

For all tenancy deposit scheme posts, click here.

Waiting For Tiensia

Qurat-Ul-Ain Zia v Mourtada Central London County Court 09/02/2010

This case in Central London County Court has been reported briefly in Legal Action [but we have had the transcript - NL]. While this post makes reference to the Tiensia case this matter actually concerns an issue which will probably not be dealt with by the Court of Appeal. Specifically, it deals with the question of whether a tenancy deposit taken prior to the introduction of the tenancy deposit protection schema should be placed into protection on the renewal of a tenancy.

Facts
The facts are simple. A number of consecutive tenancies had been entered into between Q and M, the most recent commencing on 6 December 2008. The tenancy agreement for this tenancy made reference to a deposit of £1400 described in the agreement with the words “Deposit £1,400 (already held)”. A further clause in the agreement made provision for the payment of a deposit by M to Q to hold for the term. This clause apparently was a reference to the deposit already held by Q. M fell into arrears of rent and Q issued a notice under section 8 of the Housing Act 1988 for possession. M counter-claimed for the usual penalties for an unprotected deposit to be offset against the arrears of rent.

Received
The argument revolves around the wording of s213(4) of Housing Act 2004 which states that a tenancy deposit taken in relation to an AST must be dealt with in accordance with the legislation “as from the time it is received”. For M it was contended that the money was received anew each time the tenancy was renewed. Q argued that the word ‘received’ should be given its natural meaning and the deposit monies were not received in December 2008 but much earlier, prior to the introduction of the requirement to protect in April 2007.

Judgement
The Court was not prepared to follow the arguments advanced for Q. It was held that the deposit, while not physically repaid and paid again at each tenancy renewal was, nonetheless, received anew each time. The Court drew a distinction between the “nature and function” of the monies and the manner in which they had physically been held. Accordingly, it was held that the deposit had been ‘received’ in December 2008, had not been properly protected, and therefore judgement was given for M for the usual penalty of three times the deposit.

Discussion
With respect to the Court (and possibly courting the opprobrium of he masses) I am going to suggest that this decision is incorrect. If we consider the ruling of Longmore LJ in the Court of Appeal decision in UK Housing Alliance v Francis (which we discussed here) he states that the Act contains a “pervading reference to money ‘paid’ by the tenant to the landlord, ‘received’ by the landlord and ‘repayable’ by the landlord to the tenant”. Admittedly this judgement was given in reference to a situation in which the tenant had never transferred any money to the landlord but had had a sum that was potentially due withheld. However, this reference to payment as highlighted by Longmore LJ would seem to require a transfer of monies at each stage. It is clearly not the case that M paid money to Q on each renewal and therefore I would venture to suggest that the suggestion that there is a form of virtual receipt on each renewal is an overly strained construction.

With thanks to Alan Mullem at Moss Beachley Mullem & Coleman for the copy of the full judgement.

A bumper pack of unlawful eviction – updates from Legal Action

In the second post of County Court cases you will already have read in June’s Legal Action Housing updates, we turn to unlawful eviction and harassment. And it appears to have been a rich few months in this regard, with no fewer than five cases to note.

Fakhari v Newman, Woolwich County Court 07/01/2010
Mr F granted Mr N a one year AST in May 2008. Monthly rent of £985 and one months rent taken as deposit. The deposit was not protected. The boiler in the property had problems from the start and broke down completely in December 2008. Mr N was without heating and hot water until June 2009, when hot water, but not heating, was restored. There were draughty, defective windows that leaked. From December 2008, Mr F and his sister telephoned and texted Mr N continually, telling him to leave. They also tried to get him to sign a new tenancy agreement for an extra £500 per month. Mr N was threatened and told it was ‘not safe’ for him to remain. They attended without appointment. Mr F’s sister told the police that Mr N had tried to blow up the property. Mr F claimed possession. Mr N counterclaimed.

On the counterclaim the following awards were made:
£2,995 under s.214 Housing Act 2004 – the failure to protect deposit. Deposit to be protected within 28 days.
£9,250 for disrepair (25% of rent May 2008 to December 2008; 75% of rent December 2008 and June 2009; 43% of rent from June 2009 onwards)
£2,000 for harassment
£2,000 in exemplary damages

Walsh v Shuangyan. Manchester County Court 14/01/2010
Ms S granted Mr W the tenancy of a room in an HMO in June 2009. Rent was £298 per month. There were six other tenants of rooms in the same house. In July 2009, the local authority served notices on Ms S as the HMO was unlicenced under Housing Act 2004 and requiring various remedial works to the electrical installation and the boiler. ON 8 August, Ms S disconnected the boiler, ending heating and hot water. Four occupants moved out over the next few days. On 31 August the electricity supply was disconnected by Ms S. After a further two tenants moved out, Mr W was the sole occupant. Ms S and her father then embarked on a campaign of harassment and threats against Mr W. He was assaulted and his door kicked. On one occasion, Mr W had to barricade himself in his room for a night as MS S and her father remained in the house to try to get him to leave. On 16 September 2009, he returned home to find the locks had been changed and some of his possessions put into bin bags outside. He could not get at the majority of his belongings still in the room.

The local authority’s tenancy relations officer contacted Ms S and told her that her actions were unlawful. She refused to readmit Mr W. Mr W obtained an injunction requiring readmission. Ms S failed to comply and an order was made committing her to prison for 28 days.

Mr W spent 30 days sofa surfing, missed work and got a painful back as a result.

The DJ awarded:
£2,000 for pre-eviction harassment
£6,000 for the eviction and consequences (a daily rate of £200)
Aggravated damages of £4,000
Exemplary damages of £1,500 – representing the costs Ms S might have incurred for legal advice and lawful eviction proceedings.
Special damages of £5,750 – being the value of the items lost from Mr W’s room and loss of income
Interest of £204
Costs at the indemnity rate

Comment
Not sure about the calculation of exemplary damages there. The measure is, in my view, the potential (not actual) gain made by the tortfeasor as a result of the tortious act. While saving legal and court expenses is one way of looking at this, the question might also be what was the value to Ms S of the property with vacant possession? In the absence of further facts, it is hard to tell, but Ms S determination suggests a further value/gain beyond saving possession proceeding costs.

Anslow v Hayes, Manchester County Court 15/10/2009
Mr H granted Mr A a tenancy of a room in an HMO. Rent of £350. Mr A moved in on 1 September 2007. Over the next few months, Mr A accrued rent arrears at a modest level. Mr H threatened to evict him. On 17 December 2007, Mr A returned to find he could not access the property. He called Mr H, who refused to let him in. Mr H then called the police to tell them there was someone acting suspiciously outside the house.

Mr A went to the local authority tenancy relations officer and to a solicitor, who both called Mr H. Mr H refused to readmit Mr A. Mr H apparently agreed Mr A could collect his belongings, but hen packed the belongings without Mr A’s permission. Mr A was not allowed in and his girlfriend had to retrieve what she could recognise as belonging to Mr A. Some items had been removed or disposed of. Mr A spent 73 days living in very cramped conditions with his girlfriend before being able to find alternative accommodation. Mr A claimed. Mr H filed a defence but failed to turn up at trial.

The Recorder awarded:
£7,000 General damages for the 73 day period deprived of occupation of his home
£2,000 aggravated damages, given that Mr H had been warned of the illegality of his actions
£1,000 exemplary damages on the basis of estimated costs of legal advice and lawful possession proceedings
Interest
Costs

Comment
The exemplary calculation probably makes more sense here, where the motive for the unlawful eviction was arrears and it is likely that the result would have been a re-let at a similar rate. In those circumstances, costs of advice and lawful proceedings is a cunning way of giving a basis for ‘gain’ for exemplary purposes.

Schuchard v Fu, Brentford County Court 25/02/2010
Mr S had an AST of one room in an HMO. The landlady wanted possession of the property for renovation and write a number of letters. No s.21 Notice was served or proceedings brought. In July 2009, the landlady sent a letter ‘requiring’ Mr S to leave the next day due to rent arrears. The following day, she attended with locksmiths and changed the locks. She refused to give Mr F a key. Most of Mr F’s possession were inaccessible in his room. The day after the change of locks the local authority tenancy relations officer called the landlady and asked her to readmit Mr F. She refused unless the rent arrears were cleared. Mr F instructed solicitors who wrote to the landlady, who continued to refuse to readmit Mr F.

Mr F was street homeless for 120 days. The local authority refused to provide accommodation during this time. The LA then provided 77 days temporary accommodation while considering a National Assistance Act 1948 duty, which was then discharged. A further 35 days were spent sleeping on a friend’s floor.

On Mr F’s claim, the District Judge awarded:
£200 per day general and aggravated damages for the 120 days street homeless – £24,000
£2,000 for the 77 days in LA temporary accommodation
£125 per day general and aggravated damages for the 35 days sleeping on a friend’s floor – £4,375
£1,750 exemplary damages as ‘the eviction was partly so that the landlord could do up the property with a cynical disregard for Mr S’s rights’.

Comment
Again, exemplary damages are odd here (can you see a hobby horse on the horizon). What is the measure of the tortfeasor’s gain or intended gain?

Keddy v Hughes, Sheffield County Court 12/03/2010
Mr K lived in the property from 2005 with his mother, then became the tenant in June 2007. Mr H state that Mr K had agreed to move out in October 2008. If he did so, Mr K changed his mind and decided not to move out. Mr H had arranged new tenants.

Mr H attended the property and assaulted Mr K twice. He returned later with three other men. Mr K was assaulted and physically ejected from the property. He returned to the property later the same day. A week or several later Mr K returned home to find Mr H inside packing up furniture. Most of Mr K’s possessions had been put in bin liners, some damaged. Mr K decided to leave and not return. He stayed in a B&B for 3 or 4 weeks before being accommodated by the Local Authority under Housing Act 1996 Part VII.

On Mr K’s claim, the Recorder awarded:
£165 per night for 28 days after the unlawful eviction – £4,620
£1,500 for harassment and trespass to person and property
£1,000 in aggravated damages
£2,000 in exemplary damages on the basis that ‘the ejection from the property had been public upsetting and humiliating’. Mr H had been warned by the local authority against unlawfully evicting Mr K. Mr K had acknowledged he was aware of HA 1988 requirements. Rent sought for new tenants exceeded that paid by Mr K.
£750 special damages

Comment
On exemplary damages once more – from the report the justification for exemplary damages sounds like an unholy amalgam of the proper basis for aggravated damages (the public humiliation, the warning buy the LA) and exemplary (deliberate unlawful act in pursuit of gain, increase in rent as return).

I’ve said this before and failed to do anything about it, but I really do feel a post on aggravated and exemplary damages coming on. When I have time. Not for a while.

Tenancy Deposits- A Novel Argument on Hold

Hashemi & Johnson v Gladehurst Properties Ltd, HHJ Cryan, Clerkenwell & Shoreditch County Court, 9 December 2009, Unreported

This matter is by way of an appeal from a decision of DJ Stary refusing to set aside a decision of DJ Manners to strike out the Claimants claim for the usual penalty of three times the deposit pursuant to s214 of the Housing Act 2004 as a response to the Defendants failure to register it with an approved scheme.

The tenancy agreement had implied that the deposit would be registered but it required the Claimants to request this and pay an additional administrative fee. They did not do so and the deposit was never registered. The Claimants vacated the property in 2008 and after the Defendant made deductions from their deposit they commenced a claim for the return of the deducted money plus the normal three times the deposit figure.

The claim had a number of procedural issues. For one, although there were two tenants, and therefore two Claimants, only one of them, Mr Hashemi, appeared to be bringing the claim, Mr Johnson apparently having returned to America. By the time of the hearing before HHJ Cryan J had produced a witness statement which appeared to make H his agent in the case, however the precise nature of the relationship and the consnet given was not clear.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this case is the differing views of the tenancy deposit provisions on the part of all three judges involved in this matter.

  • DJ Manners struck out the claim on the basis that the tenancy had ended before the application was made.
  • DJ Stary refused to overturn the decision of DJ Manners on the basis that the Claimants had acted unfairly by not notifying the Defendant during the tenancy of its failure to protect the deposit when it might have been able to remedy the situation. DJ Stary also seemed to feel that she had a degree of discretion in the making of any order in regard to an unprotected deposit, something not provided for in the Act.
  • Finally, HHJ Cryan, set aside the decision of DJ Stary. He got the law right but still made an error, albeit a trivial one, in stating that there were two custodial deposit schemes and one insured scheme as opposed to the other way around. He dismissed the argument advanced for the landlord that as the Act stated that the application could be made by ‘the tenant’ it could only be made during the currency of the tenancy and not after it had ended.

HHJ Cryan has restored the claim for the Defendant. We understand that there is a permission to appeal request pending in the Court of Appeal but that this has been stayed until after the decision in the conjoined matters of Universal Estates v Tiensia and Honeysuckle Properties v Fletcher.

This case is interesting in respect of the argument that the tenant can only claim during the lifetime of the tenancy which was dismissed; the suggestion by DJ Stary that a tenant should not deliberately wait until after the end of the tenancy to ‘ambush’ the landlord with a claim, also dismissed; and finally the suggestion that where there are joint tenants they must make the claim together, a point which was not decided due to the involvement of the second tenant by the time of the appeal but one which has apparently swayed judges in other County Courts.

The full judgement can be found here.

With thanks to William Ford of Osbornes who provided a copy of the judgement.

Oh Brave New World

Eastland Homes Partnership Limited v Sandra Whyte 2010 EWHC 695 (QB)

Following Weaver v L&Q and McIntyre v Gentoo, here is a clear indication of the brave new world of public law in which RSLs (sorry, PRHPs) find themselves. It is also an interesting and useful example of a public law defence (gateway b) in action and raises the issue of ‘starter tenancies’ as deployed by PRHPs.

Ms Whyte had a starter tenancy from Eastland Homes. This is an assured shorthold tenancy for six months, after which , typically and according to the agreement in this case, it will either be extended for a further six months or the tenant would be granted a full assured tenancy. In the ‘starter tenancy’ period. the tenant is at risk of s.21 possession proceedings.

Unusually, Ms W was granted a second starter tenancy by Eastlands after the first, extended, one was ended by possession order. The new tenancy included an agreement by Ms W to pay the rent weekly and engage with the rent team if there were problems. After the first 6 months of this second tenancy, it was extended for a further 6 months rather than made an assured tenancy, on grounds of rent arrears of £214. At the end of the further 6 months, arrears were £367, in part because of HB being paid in arrears. There had also been an accusation of ASB – noise – against Ms W’s daughter.

On 23 February 2009, Eastlands served a notice under s.21 Housing Act 1988, requiring possession from 27 April 2009. Eastlands also sent a letter saying Ms W would not be offered an assured tenancy because of arrears and ‘neighbour nuisance’ and enclosing what was described as ‘the complaint policy’ if she wanted to appeal the decision

The document was actually Eastlands ‘starter tenancy appeals procedure’. The procedure needs quoting at length:

i) The tenant must appeal in writing within 14 days of service of the notice

ii) Appeals will be heard in person by an appeals panel consisting of two members of the Claimant’s Board of Management and a Chief Executive or a Director, but not the Director of Neighbourhood Services

iii) Appeals will be heard and a decision reached at least two weeks before the notice to quit expires

iv) The Tenant has the right to attend the appeal hearing and to bring or to be represented by someone of their choice such as a legal representative, advice worker or friend.  Written presentations and arguments can be submitted

v) The Claimant will give the tenant at least five days notice of the date, time and venue of the hearing

vi) Advance copies of any written evidence which will be referred to at the hearing will be supplied

vii) The Claimant will present its case at the hearing. The tenant will have an opportunity to ask questions and get clarification.  The tenant may question anyone giving evidence. The tenant will then present his case.

viii) The appeals panel must decide whether the Section 21 Notice was served correctly, if it was appropriate in terms of the evidence provided and if the decision to end the tenancy will “stand up to scrutiny”

ix) The panel must establish the facts of the case that are not in dispute, resolve any facts that are disputed and relate those to the action the Claimant is taking to end the tenancy

x) On balance, after hearing from the tenant, the panel will need to decide whether the tenant has broken the tenancy agreement and, if so, whether the breach justifies eviction

xi) The Claimant will write to the tenant with the panel decision within seven days of the hearing.  Whatever the decision, the tenant will be informed of what will happen next and “if the appeal fails, details of how they can appeal further if they wish”

xii) Reasons will be given for the appeal panel decision.

Ms W sent in a written appeal refering to HB issues and an agreement to pay £10 per week. On the ASB, this was the first time any problems with her daughter had been brought to her attention. Eastlands acknowledged the letter on 30 April. On 5 May, they wrote to say the appeal would be heard 12 May. Ms W didn’t attend. At the meeting a housing officer presented a written report on the current tenancy. The panel considered arrears, £380 at that point, decided not to include ASB as an issue as there was nothing that could be formally evidenced, examined the previous starter tenancy and decided that as there was no evidence of a ‘significant effort’ to keep rent up to date, no assured tenancy would be offered, no further extension and terminating the tenancy was appropriate. A letter was sent to Ms W stating the conclusion but giving no reasons. It also said Eastlands would apply for a warrant.

That was more than a little premature. Instead possession proceedings were issued based on the s.21 notice.

In view of Ms W’s defence, HHJ Holman decided to sit as a High Court Judge.

Ms W’s defence (as amended) made the case that the decision of the Claimant to seek possession was unlawful, procedurally unfair, unreasonable and disproportionate – the public law defence -under the following headings:

i) In conducting the appeal into the decision to serve the Section 21 Notice the Claimant failed to act in accordance with its own published policy:
a) failure to hear the appeal and promulgate a decision at least two weeks before the expiry of the Section 21 Notice
b) failure to supply advance copies of written or other evidence
c) failure to inform the Defendant how she might appeal further
d) failure to provide any proper reasons for the decision
ii) Failing to taking into account material considerations, in particular (a) the Defendant’s recent payments to the rent account and (b) the level of arrears generally.
iii) Even if all relevant circumstances were taken into account the decision was one which no reasonable authority could have reached.
iv) Breach of the principles of natural justice in that the Claimant refused a reasonable request for the hearing to be adjourned, given that the Defendant had received less than seven days notice of it and had been unable to obtain legal advice prior to it.
v) Breach by the Claimant of its own policy on the use of starter tenancies in that it granted the Defendant a second starter tenancy.

A further ground of unnecessary and disproportionate interference with Art 8 rights was conceded to be not open to Ms W to argue in the High Court in view of Kay and Doherty, with her position reserved for a higher court if necessary.

In setting out the defence, Ms W asserted that Eastlands was a public body for the purposes of judicial review and human rights. Eastlands accepted that Weaver bound the court but reserved its position for arguing in a higher court.

Held
On gateway b challenges:
Following Smith v Buckland [2008] 1 WLR 661, the challenge extended beyond Wednesbury unreasonableness.

Following Central Bedfordshire Council v Taylor [2010] 1 WLR 446 and Barber v Croydon LBC[2010] EWCA Civ 51 (and contra Doran v Liverpool CC [2009] 1 WLR 2365), at issue is a series of decisions, from deciding to serve notice through to enforcement of a warrant. However, contra Eastland’s argument based on Ms W’s failure to keep to a post-issue argeement on repayment of arrears, the continuum does not cut both ways.

Gateway (b) requires the authority to keep the situation under regular review. This is for the protection of the tenant and Gateway (b) provides a defence to the claim. If the authority makes a decision which no reasonable person would consider justifiable, the guillotine comes down, as it were.

That decision is not retrospectively rendered lawful by a subsequent default of the tenant.

On the specific grounds of the defence, contra Eastland’s argument that procedural aspects were a private matter not amenable to review, it would be artificial to separate issue of procedure and substance.

The appeal and promulgation of the decision did not take place at least two weeks before the expiry of the s.21 notice, but it was difficult to discern how Ms W was prejudiced by this, if at all.

The letter notifying the decision of the panel did not spell out the reasons for the decision, but too legalistic an approach should not be adopted here. Again, no discernible prejudice to Ms W.

The leaflet on the the appeal process indicated that there could be a further appeal. Eastlands asserted instead that there was no further appeal available. There was clearly an issue of legitimate expectation in play. The potential for a further appeal may influence conduct on the initial appeal and the potential for a further appeal was clearly stated in the leaflet and no explanation put forward as to why it was so.

Ms W’s payments towards rent did not support any criticism that the panel had failed to take them into account. Failure to consider the level of arrears generally was another matter, on which more below.

The generalised assertion that the decision to evict was one which no reasonable authority could have reached added nothing by itself.

The allegation that a reasonable request to adjourn was refused was unsustainable. There was no evidence that such a request had been made.

That Eastlands had failed to adhere to its own policy by granting a second starter tenancy didn’t get Ms W anywhere. There was no a legitimate expectation that the tenancy would be converted to an assured once Ms W had paid of the initial arrears and been allowed to remain. There was already a possession order and, on the state of the law at that time (pre Knowsley HT v White in the House of Lords), there could be no legitimate expectation of getting an assured tenancy as the AST would have been ended. There was no infringement of her existing rights (Wandsworth v Winder [1985] AC 461) as the right was to an AST, not an assured tenancy.

The appeal panel had wholly failed to provide advance copies of the evidence to Ms W before the hearing. Although the ASB issue was dropped at the hearing, Ms W had no way of knowing this. A reasonable panel would have checked that copy evidence had been provided and if it hadn’t it would have been a very bold panel which would have proceeded in the circumstances. Any argument of lack of prejudice made by Eastlands was a slippery slope and not to be endorsed.

The courts are entitled to expect that RSLs, in the same way as local authorities, will, for the protection of the interests of their tenants, adhere to their procedures. Not every failure will be significant, having regard to all the circumstances. The breach at paragraph 32 above is an obvious example. However, the provision of the evidence in advance is of obvious importance. Indeed I would hold that fairness dictates that it is essential that the tenant knows what material the landlord is proposing to put forward. It may, for example, give rise to a dispute of fact. Such disputes can arise even in the context of rent arrears. The tenant needs to be forewarned. It may also influence the tenant’s decision as to whether or not to seek outside help.

In addition, while the housing officer’s report only dealt with the current (second) tenancy, the panel had gone on to consider the arrears history under the first tenancy. Given that Ms W was not there, the prejudice was palpable and even if she had been present she would not have been aware in advance that matters beyond the existing tenancy were to be considered. And the appeal panel had to ask for the rent account to be produced.

Eastlands’ general policies, such as the ‘rent escalation policy’, ‘rent arrears policy’ and a page from another document that Eastlands were unable to identify but agreed with in evidence, make clear that the usual policy was not to seek an outright possession order in arrears cases unless there was a ‘clear and deliberate failure’ to pay. Ms W did not argue for a legitimate expectation based on these documents, in view of Weaver v L&Q in the High Court (on ground 8), but contended that these policy documents ought to have been considered at the panel hearing and that the panel should have indicated why, i the light of the policy, the decision was made to terminate the tenancy. There was no evidence that the panel had considered the policies or considered whether Ms W’s failure to pay was deliberate – in fact it had evidence to the contrary about housing benefit difficulties. The modest size of the arrears, about £380 at that date, emphasised the need for careful scrutiny.

For these combined reasons, the decision to seek eviction was one no reasonable authority could have reached. The key points being:
- failure to supply written evidence in advance
- the broadening of matters considered by the panel beyond the information in the case summary
- the failure to consider their own clearly stated policy for dealing with rent arrears, which also applied to starter tenancies.
- Of less import, but still a factor is Ms W’s legitimate expectation of a further appeal. Applying R(Bibi) v Newham LBC [2002] 1 WLR 237, Eastlands had committed itself in the appeal procedure document to a further appeal and it ignored this. By itself perhaps not a sufficient factor, but in the context of the other issues, regard must be had to this.

On rememdy, either the defence is made out or it is not. If it is, then the claim for possession stands to be dismissed. So ordered.

Permission to appeal was granted to Eastlands, not least because the Court of Appeal hasn’t considered starter tenancies, but also on the contentious public body and human rights issues not arguable in the High Court.

We understand that Eastlands have not pursued the appeal, so this is not going any further.

Comment
This is an interesting case in various ways. There is the starter tenancy issue, although given that the statutory exclusions that are involved in Introductory and Demoted tenancies are wholly absent, it is not a surprise that the court felt able to deal with a gateway b defence without any qualms. There are the successful elements of the defence, although there are distinct parallels with Barber where the failure to follow clearly set out policy was found to be a course no reasonable authority would have taken. There are some useful lessons on the best way to plead a public law defence in there as well.

But overall it is, after McIntyre, going to be another wake up call to RSLs on what a post Weaver world might look like. Where Eastlands failed was not a matter of not meeting a standard of the Court’s own devising, it was a failure to meet their own stated policy and procedure and doing so in a manner that could clearly prejudice the tenant. Anecdotal experience suggests that a fair few RSLs/PRSHPs are used to making decisions on the hoof, or by reference to whatever they want to throw in there, or by whatever the officers concerned consider to be fair or justified. The worst sanction they might have faced would be a telling off by the Ombudsman. Here is a clear example of the brave new world that they find themselves in, where even a mandatory, s.21 based, possession claim can be dismissed.

Our grateful thanks to Ben McCormack at Garden Court North for details on this case.

A farewell to the RSL

On 17 March 2010, the ‘The Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 (Consequential Provisions) Order 2010′, SI 2010 NO. 866 was made. Also enacted on 17 March was The Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 (Commencement No. 7 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) Order 2010, SI 2010 NO. 862. Both come into force on 1 April 2010. The upshot is that the Tenant Services Authority becomes the regulator for both RSLs (as where) and Local Authority housing providers. But of course, there must be some changes of name. The TSA is, for the purposes of the Act at least, now the ‘Regulator of Social Housing’, but that is not all.

From 1 April 2010, RSLs are no more, becoming instead ‘private registered providers of social housing’. while Scottish Homes becomes ‘a non-profit registered provider of social housing’.

‘Private’? Does one detect the result of lobbying, post Weaver.

Today’s challenge is to browse the full list of amended legislation and to find bits they’ve missed…