I’m maybe less concerned than you about the late severance. Practically, this is what happens. People have no idea about the legal effect of the forms of title and I have no trouble with the idea that their intentions may be radically different – as long as there is sufficient for that intention to be inferred, or even, post Stack, there is a course of conduct sufficient for the court to impute intention.

I’m less happy with ‘fairness’, although I can see the argument put forward in this judgment that fairness as a means of weighing up the course of dealing is a necessary component of imputing intention as long as it is not imposed over the apparent intention. But, in this case, it is hard to avoid the view that ‘fairness’ based on current circumstances has overridden a fair view of the whole course of dealing, including the contributions to the value of the property, presumably on the basis that there was a wholescale change in imputable intention which, to some extent (apparently 40% of extent) overrode any previous course of dealing.

And I say this as one who usually, but not exclusively, acts for those asserting a beneficial interest over their entitlement in law.

As you have rightly pointed out, I have some difficulty with this decision. Nicholas Strauss QC accepts that Mr K’s contribution to the property must represent not far short of 50% (see para [48]) and, as you say, Mr K has not received any benefit from the property during the time that he has not lived there despite being a beneficial co-owner and arguably being entitled to some benefit (even if it is not the benefit of living in it). Also, there was no severance of the beneficial joint tenancy until 2008. Need I say more?