Archive for June, 2008

Deficiency in a decision

Published
by
NL
on 19 June 2008
in Housing law
. 4 Comments

London Borough of Lambeth v Johnston [2008] EWCA Civ 690 is an appeal to the Court of Appeal from a County Court s.204 appeal.

The brief facts - the Claimant applied to Lambeth as homeless in September 2004. He told the officer he had an alcohol problem Lambeth put him into temporary accommodation. In September 2005, with no further interview or enquiries, Lambeth made a s.184 decision that he was not vulnerable.

At s.202, this was upheld, despite new evidence from the Claimant’s drug dependency agency that he was Class A dependant and alcoholic. He was now on a treatment programme but in a vulnerable condition. There was also evidence from his GP to the same effect. The s.202 said not vulnerable, , based on a Nowmedical opinion on drug and alcohol abuse.

At the first s.204 appeal, the Court held that the s.202 was inadequate in its response to the material available, over-reliant on the Nowmedical opinion, and Wednesbury unreasonable. However, the Court also said that even if this was not so, the failure to conduct furthe enquiries or a fresh interview during the year before the s.184 decision would mean that there was a serious procedural irregularity in the decision. This should have been obvious to the reviewer, triggering regulation 8(2) of The Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Review Procedures) Regulations 1999:

(2) If the reviewer considers that there is a deficiency or irregularity in the original decision, or in the manner in which it was made, but is minded nonetheless to make a decision which is against the interests of the applicant on one or more issues, the reviewer shall notify the applicant –

(a) that the reviewer is so minded and the reasons why; and

(b) that the applicant, or someone acting on his behalf, may make representations to the reviewer orally or in writing or both orally and in writing.

The reviewer had failed to do this. The matter was remitted for a fresh s.202.

The new s.202 also concluded that the Claimant was not vulnerable. There was no notification that the reviewer was minded to make a decision against the applicant.

The Claimant went to s.204 appeal on, in part, the grounds that Lambeth were in breach of Reg 8(2) in failing to notify of being minded to find adversely despite the clear deficiency in the s.184 process. The Court agreed and upheld the appeal, with costs. Lambeth appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Lambeth argued that

  • Given the facts and history of this case, all parties were well aware of the specific issues under consideration in the s.202 and that a Reg 8(2) noification would have served no purpose.
  • The review officer had considered the deficiency - which had in any case been raised at the first appeal - and, after talking to Lambeth Legal, decided that in the circumstances, it wasn’t necessary to send a notification.

The Court agreed that in the specific circumstances of this case, the notificiation may have made little or no practical difference, but that was beside the point. Accepting the Claimant’s arguments, the Court found that Reg 8(2) was not an option, or dependent on the review officer’s view on its practical benefit to the applicant. It was a duty imposed by the terms of the regulation if there was an apparent deficiency or irregularity in the s.184 decision - either in the process of making it or in the decision itself.

The Court’s statement on the importance of the regulation is worth noting.

53. It is one thing for an applicant to be able to make representations on the matters in issue and then apprehensively await the review officer’s decision, whichever way it may go. It is quite another for an applicant, not just to be able to make such representations, but then also to be given (i) advance notice of the review officer’s reasons for his provisionally adverse views, and (ii) the opportunity not just to make further written representations as to why those views are not justified by his reasons, but also oral representations to that effect. Previously the applicant will simply have addressed the issues as best he can. Now he will have the opportunity to respond specifically to the review officer’s own reasons as to how he proposes to deal with the issues. That is a most important advantage to the applicant. It may well, in many cases, enable him to engage in no more than an exercise of advocacy. But advocacy can turn a case. There can be few judges who, having formed a provisionally adverse view on a skeleton argument advanced in support of a case, have not then found their view transformed by the subsequent oral argument for which, in the art of advocacy, there is no comparable substitute. The opportunity open to an applicant to try, by written and/or oral argument, to persuade the review officer that his reasoning for his provisional conclusion is mistaken is – at the very least – potentially of great benefit to an applicant. To be deprived of that right is or may be seriously prejudicial.

The Court upheld the s.204 appeal finding that the failure to consider that this was a case where Reg 8(2) was engaged was indefensible and unlawful. Hall v. Wandsworth London Borough Council [2005] 2 All ER 192 followed.

Failure by the review officer to adequately consider, in an objective manner, whether a s.184 decision is deficient or irregular in content or process is susceptible to judicial review principles (Wednesbury unreasonableness) and therefore also to s.204 appeal.

[Many thanks to a reader and commentor here for sending his own report, which was useful for me, but alas, for reasons of employment related discretion, it couldn't be posted. But guest posts/case notes isn't a bad idea...]

I give in.

Published
by
NL
on 18 June 2008
in whatever
. 3 Comments

I have ignored this question, then I have mocked it. But dammit, the google searches for ‘what is Anor in legal terms’, or variants thereof, keep flooding in. They are now up to about 15 or more a week.

So I give in. Clearly absolutely nobody is able to deduce meaning from context any more and I must pander to the new google literalists.

Anor in legal terms is an abbreviation for ‘another’, as in X and another v Literal Borough Council.

Are you all happy now? Doesn’t it seem suddenly obvious? Just don’t expect a great legal career given that you actually had to ask.

Children Act - housing and education

Published
by
NL
on 17 June 2008
in Housing law
. 0 Comments

C, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Lambeth [2008] EWHC 1230 (Admin) is, in the end, mainly concerned with education, but there is quite a bit of interest to housing people.

The issue was the duties owed to the Claimant under s.23 and s.24 Children Act 1989.

The Claimant had been in care with Lambeth. Shortly before her 18th birthday, Lambeth gave her tenancy of a one bed flat. The next year, after suffering a serious sexual assault at the flat, C left to stay with friends and a former foster mother. In 2207, she was briefly street homeless, before the application for Judicial Review was made. She was accommodated by Lambeth after an interim order.

The judicial review application concerned Lambeth’s failings in three duties to a ‘looked after child’ - housing, community care, education and training.

In the meantime, the claimant turned 21. In view of the ongoing proceedings, Lambeth agreed that if any breach of duty was found, then it would not make an issue of C now being over 21.

Shortly before the substantive hearing, Lambeth accepted a permanent housing duty and a duty to make a community care assessment. The education aspect remained at issue. Lambeth maintained that no education and training duty existed because a course of study had not been identified in a pathway plan that had been adopted before C turned 21. In any case, the pathway plans that had been prepared had not been adopted by the Council.

The Court held, following R(J) v Caerphilly County Borough Council [2005] EWHC 586 Admin; [2005] 2 FLR 860, that the pathway plans that existed had not been properly prepared as they had been prepared by C’s personal advisor. The plan was descriptive rather than establishing proposed courses of action and assistance for C.

The Council’s failure to adopt the plan did not make much of a difference as its evidence was that the plan would have been the same if it had adopted it. The plan requires objective assessment so that all parties can see what it envisages, identify progress or the reasons for the lack of it.

In addition, the plan recognised that the then housing problems had had a major effect on C’s educational aims. C’s difficulties in engaging with the course she had been undertaking were therefore in part due to Lambeth’s failure to accept the housing duty, and also, given C’s mental health difficulties, the failure to undertake a community care assessment.

It was artificial to separate out the educational duty from the housing and community care duty where they were clearly interlinked. C was therefore successful.

HB as rent for RTB

Published
by
NL
on 16 June 2008
in Housing law
. 0 Comments

Hanoman v London Borough of Southwark [2008] EWCA Civ 624

Where a local authority landlord has failed to respond to a tenant’s notice in time under the Right to Buy procedure, the tenant can serve an ‘operative notice of delay’ under s.153A(5) Housing Act 1985. The effect of this notice is that the landlord must deduct from the purchase price an amount based on the rent paid during the period of the delay (s.153B).

Does housing benefit, whether as payment, or as rebate on rent payable to local authority, count as rent for the purposes of s.153B?

Simple answer - yes. S.153B makes no prescription as to the source of rent payments and it would be ludicrous to distinguish between housing benefit as payment and housing benefit as rebate.

There is also an interesting side issue on preserving rights in a dispute over RTB terms after completion of the sale by way of collateral contract.

Liability for mesne profits

Published
by
NL
on 16 June 2008
in Housing law
. 0 Comments

Jones v London Borough of Merton [2008] EWCA Civ 660 addresses whether a tolerated trespasser’s liability to pay mesne profits ends when they leave the property or when they notify the former landlord that they have left.

Ordinary trespassers are only liable for mesne profits for the period of actual occupation of a property. Merton submitted that tolerated trespassers were in a different position. Public policy required that housing authorities be notified as soon as possible that occupation was at an end to enable re-letting. There was a direct analogy with the requirement that a secure tenant end the tenancy by notice to quit under s.5 Protection from Eviction Act 1977 as the tolerated trespasser had a distinctive status.

The Court said this was not so. The only valuable, distinctive right of the tolerated trespasser, the right to apply for revival, ends when execution is no longer required to give effect to the possession order, which is when the trespasser has left the property. Liability for mesne profits only extends to the period of actual occupation and there is no requirement for formal notification of giving up occupation to the landlord.

On a side note, possession (as in occupation) requires both factual possession and intention to possess. One cannot be said to have given it up until there is no intention to possess. JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. Graham [2002] UKHL 30 applied. There is some dissension between the judgments as to when, on the facts of the case, this was manifest in this case.

Notes for later

Published
by
NL
on 16 June 2008
in Housing law
. 0 Comments

As ever, housing cases come in a flood after a drought.

Jones v London Borough of Merton [2008] EWCA Civ 660 on when liability for mesne profits ends after the tolerated trespasser leaves a property.

Hanoman v London Borough of Southwark [2008] EWCA Civ 624 on when housing benefit counts as rent under RTB rules.

And C, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Lambeth [2008] EWHC 1230 (Admin) on housing duties under the Childrens Act.

I’ll get to as many of them as I can tonight and the rest tomorrow.

On the naughty step

Published
by
NL
on 12 June 2008
in whatever
. 19 Comments

The family firm.

It has such a reassuring sound, redolent of values of client care handed down through the generations, and the energy of youth brought under the careful supervision of wisdom. The very best traditions of the local small firm, a foundation stone of the community.

Or not.

Karim Solicitors, consisting of Imran Karim (40), supposedly senior partner, his sister Saira (39) and their mother Shamim (65) have all been struck off the roll in one fell swoop, after leaving a trail of dishonesty proceedings and panicking liability insurers behind them.

Exhibit A, Zurich Professional Ltd v Karim & others, (see page 3 of this pdf) in which Zurich sought, successfully, to avoid liability on claims for misappropriated funds by clients on the basis that the claims arose out of dishonesty and/or fraud, primarily by the first defendant, Shamim Karim, who was found to be the controlling power behind the firm. For the detailed factual background to this case see paras 28 - 33 of this account [PDF]

Exhibit B, the SDT, following a decade long investigation, struck all three off the roll (in their absence). Dishonest use of clients’ money, to the tune of £840,000 was not the only problem.

The money, Imran said, had been spent by him on “a Rolex, loose women and drink”. However, his sister Saira took a more prudent approach and invested her money in business ventures, including the ‘Miss Nude UK’ beauty contest. [See BBC story here, featuring Saira as 'founder']

Sadly ‘Miss Nude UK’ proved to be the beginning of their downfall, when in 1999, company documents for the ‘beauty contest’ arrived at the Law Society in an envelope from Karim Solicitors, who then denied all knowledge.

Imran and Saira had put all the blame on Mommy Dearest, who had been found to be the dominant force in Zurich v Karim, but, as in that case, the manner in which the brother and sister had corruptly permitted Shamim to run the firm was enough to damn them. All three were culpable. Interim costs order of £75,000 made.

The Karims have the right to appeal the SDT decision and are apparently intending to do so.

[edit 13 June] This just gets better. See this newspaper story. Imran had a serious premiership footballer and Krystal habit. Saira set up Miss Nude UK with Nick Reynolds, the son of Great Train Robber Bruce ‘Butch’ Reynolds. Despite being on Sky TV, Miss Nude UK wasn’t enough to rescue the situation, particularly as Saira had also also put money into a ‘failed music business’.

Mind you, there was the alleged apartment in New York and the ‘large home in Esher’ (Ahh, fragrant Esher) to console her. Document shredding and claims of being authorised to take mortgage holders money (Eh?) were not enough of a defence.

After a series of raids beginning in 1999 investigators found £450,000 had been misappropriated from the proceeds of a house sale belonging to clients Mr K and Miss D.

A further £390,000 had been taken from mortgage cash advanced by Northern Rock to Mrs Binu Govindan, who sold her home in Brighton Road, Purley and was buying a property on Woodcote Valley Road.

I’ve said it before and will say it again, it is always the conveyancers you have to watch…

defendant

Suitability and marital harmony

Published
by
NL
on 10 June 2008
in Housing law
. 2 Comments

Ahad v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [2008] EWCA Civ 606 was an application for permission to appeal from a s.204 appeal concerning a refusal of an offer of permanent accommodation. Tower Hamlets had discharged duty on the basis that the appellant had refused an offer of accommodation that was suitable and reasonable for him to occupy, s.173(7F).

The appellant, his wife and three children made up the household. Tower Hamlets had accepted a duty. The appellant was bidding under a Choice Based Letting scheme, made a bid on the property and was successful. After viewing the property with his wife, he refused the offer.

On s.202 review, Tower Hamlets Law Centre made submissions as follows:

We submit that in the event it would not be reasonable for our client to accept the offer. He himself has not had any objection to the property and was inclined to accept it. However, his wife is adamantly opposed to the property. She feels that it is too small for her family’s needs. She does not like the area where it is located as she has no family there and would not feel safe there. Mrs Begum [Mr Ahad's wife] indicated to our client that he could accept the property if he wished, but that she would not move to the property and neither would their three children. Mr Ahad thus believed that if he were to accept the property he and his wife would separate. Our client was therefore faced with the choice of either refusing the offer or his marriage breaking down.

In response, in the negative 202 decision, the council said:

…that Mr Ahad had not advised the council prior to or following the offer that he and his wife had differing opinions on what constituted suitable accommodation for him and, in any event, his having bid for a property, the council could only have accepted in good faith that he and his household wished to reside in the property. As he had applied to the council, it was appropriate for them to draw the inference that he acted on behalf of the whole family on bidding for the property, and the differences of opinion between him and his wife as to the type and location of the property was a domestic matter for them to discuss and reach a conclusion before making any bid.

At s.204 Appeal, the appellant argued that the Council had failed to take into account the fresh information at review concerning the likely effect on the appellant’s marriage. if it had considered them, it had failed to give adequate reasons.

Mr Ahad had, at all times, accepted that his wife’s objections were misplaced and unreasonable.

At first appeal, the County Court held that it was reasonable for the Council to expect such disputes to be resolved within the household:

The objections fell to be considered as primary objections to suitability and the reviewing officer was entitled to reject them as a reasonable basis for refusing the offer in the light of: (a) the lack of foundation for the wife’s objections; (b) the fact that the reviewing officer found that Mr Ahad was given particulars of the property and its location before bidding for it; (c) it was a choice-based bidding system; (d) the Authority was not concerned with matrimonial problems arising between the persons to be housed in a single household and the result of a dispute as to subjective matters of suitability; and (e) the Authority was not in a position to make findings of fact as to the legitimacy of Mr Ahad’s fears about the future of his marriage.

At renewed permission to appeal hearing, Lord Justice Lawrence Collins considered whether this case raised a point of principle or practice in relation to the two part test of s.193(7F) set out in Slater v London Borough of Lewisham [2006] EWCA Civ 394 and applied in Ahmed v Leicester City Council [2007] EWCA Civ 843. That test being both objective suitability for the applicant and a subjective test of whether it was reasonable for the applicant to accept the accommodation.

The Court held there was no point of principle or practice at issue. The Council had taken the ‘new’ facts into consideration and there was no flaw in the reasoning or process.

It is worth noting that the dual test of reasonable and suitable is upheld here, with no question of the subjective test not being required, as suggested by the Court of Appeal judgment in Omar v Birmingham.

X v Hounslow

Published
by
NL
on 9 June 2008
in Housing law
. 11 Comments

I have now got hold of the judgment in X v Hounslow [2008] All ER 337 (May) (thanks to assorted helpful sprites). [Edit 23/06/08 - now up on Bailii]. Previous posts on this one are here and here - this was the case that apparently instituted a potential duty of care for local authorities to protect vulnerable adults from third parties. It could be very significant indeed.

Having read it, I can honestly say I’m not sure what to make of it at all.

First, some clarification. Although nuisance was initially pleaded, a claim in nuisance was not followed through. This therefore has nothing to do with landlord’s liability to the tenant for another tenant’s nuisance. Although there was an alternative claim under the Human Rights Act s.6 and s.7, this was not followed through by the court, as not necessary.

This was, therefore, a claim in negligence only.

Those of us who are housing focussed (to the point of tunnel vision) will be having trouble with the idea of negligence in relation to a local authority housing function (save in relation to disrepair). And I’m still not sure how it is brought about here.

Key, I think, is that there was extensive social services involvement, warnings and requests for a transfer for X, Y and their children, prior to the dreadful events of the weekend. There was also housing department involvement, both in terms of awareness of the dangers and in terms of considering a transfer (although not an emergency transfer). However, it appears to me that the model that the Court followed was precisely that of cases where a duty of care to children was found in relation to social services functions, (e.g J.D & others v East Berkshire NHS Trust & others [2003] Lloyd’s Law Reports 552 or Pierce v Doncaster MBO [2007] EWHC 2968). Housing precedents don’t feature much until the end, and then the argument is confused and confusing.

Here is how the Court reaches the decision on negligence (but shorn of most of the factual evidence).

First, the Court insisted that Hounslow was a single entity and refused to take the knowledge, acts and omissions of each department separately. Each department ought to have informed the other of the situation, and that they failed to do so did not mean that that the different departments could be treated separately.

The Court adopted the test of Caparo Industries Ltd v Dickman [1990] 2 A.C. 605 in establishing duty of care: Was the injury and loss reasonably foreseeable? Was the relationship to the Defendant sufficiently proximate to warrant the imposition of a duty? Would it be just, fair and reasonable to impose a duty.

The foreseeability was clear, at the very least from a week or three before the assaults, going on the Defendant’s social services reports, reports to the housing department by neighbours etc..

That there was a relationship of sufficient proximity was dealt with very briefly. To quote:

[107] The Defendant was the Claimants’ landlord. More importantly, the Defendant, aware of the Claimants’ disabilities, provided social services for them and indeed their children.(…) Representatives of the Social Services and Housing Departments were regularly in contact with the Claimants and visited their home during 2000. Thus there was a close relationship between the parties to this litigation.

The Court found it to be just fair and reasonable to impose the duty on the basis of a limited scope. There was a specific duty to protect in a particular way, to move them out of the flat in response to the ‘unusual but dangerous situation that had developed’. The Court notes the dictum of Brennan J in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman that novel categories of negligence should be developed incrementally and by analogy with existing categories. The existence of a duty to children was here being developed in such an incremental manner to include vulnerable people who ‘in many ways functioned like children’. In addition, case law ( JD v East Berkshire and Jain v Trent SHA [2007] EWCA Civ 1186 cited) indicates a ‘greater willingness to find the existence of duties of care subsequent to the passing of the Human Rights Act 2000.

Once the duty was imposed, breach of duty was clear. Could the Defendant have moved the Claimants out of the flat prior to the assaults? The Court found that although the Defendant’s main transfer process, its transfer to sheltered accommodation process and the ‘managment transfer’ process would all have been too slow, the ‘emergency system’, under which tenants could be transferred to B&B or temporary accommodation was available and was usually used by the housing department on the basis of information provided by social services.

On the evidence, the emergency transfer system should have been invoked. Either B&B or accommodation with relatives in the very short term were possibilities open to the Defendant.

Causation was clear, failure to move the Claimants had left them in the situation were the assault was likely and indeed took place.

Now, this seems to avoid housing law precedents on the lack of a duty of care by basically ignoring them completely, but matters take an odd turn.

At the hearing both parties apparently accepted that Hounslow’s emergency transfer provisions were governed by s.21 National Assistance Act 1948, specifically s.21(1) ‘….may make arrangments for providing (a) residential accommodation for persons… who by reason of age, illness, disability or any other circumstances are in need of care and attention which is not otherwise available to them’.

But after the hearing Hounslow sent a further note, arguing that this did not apply because s.21(8) of the NAA says ‘…Nothing in this section shall authorise or require a local authority to make any provision authorised or required to be made… by or under any enactment not contained in this Part of the Act or authorised or required to be provided under the National Health Service Act 1977″. Hounslow said that provision of emergency accommodation was governed by Part VII (s175-218) of Housing Act 1996, so it was precluded from being under s.21(1) NAA by s.21(8).

Hounslow argued that decisions on provision of social housing can only be challenged by way of judicial review, citing O’Rourke v Camden LBC [1998] A.C. 188, in which the House of Lords struck out a claim for damages for a failure to accommodate as homeless pursuant to s.63(1) Housing Act 1985. A scheme for provision of social housing for the benefit of society as a whole created no private law duty.

As HA 1996 substantially re-eacted the relevant parts of HA 1985, there was  no entitlement to a private law damages claim on the part of X & Y, just Judicial Review.

The Court was not persuaded by this. Firstly as no evidence was given at the hearing. Secondly because it is not clear that s.21(8) did exclude s.21(1) in this instance. The persons referred to in s.21(1) do not include homeless people and the ‘provision’ referred to is arguably the provision of accommodation referred to in s.21(1). (This makes sense, as I read it s.21(8) is a limiting clause on the authority/requirements of s.21 - ‘just this and no more’).

Thirdly, since the Claimants were occupying the flat pursuant to a tenancy agreement, s.175(1) HA 1996 would not apply to the Claimants and nor would s.175(2). Using s.175(3) ‘not reasonable to occupy’ would mean the Defendant was conceding that it was not reasonable for the Claimants to be in the flat, due to the circumstances of the threat and assault. But the Defendant submits that for this reason it had no duty:

[148] …Standing back and looking at the facts of the case I would regard that as a surprising conclusion… The present case is distinguishable [from O'Rourke]. The Claimants were well established tenants of the Defendant. The Defendant had already exercised its powers as to social housing in relation to the Claimants. Their claim is that they should have been moved from that accommodation, and not necessarily into furthe Council accommodation. Their claim is not based on narrow considerations of housing policy… Their claim involves both the Housing and Social Services Departments, the interaction between them; and the manner in which they reacted (or failed to react)…

I am really unsure about this, of which more below. For good measure, the Court adds:

[149] …the reality of this case is that, by virtue of whatever statutory provisions, the Defendant actually had in place an emergency transfer procedure which it could have used before the relevant weekend, and which it did in fact use though only after that weekend.

[150] I therefore regard the Claimants as having a valid cause of action.

What on earth to make of this? For starters, surely the emergency rehousing would be effected under Part VI Housing Act 1996 not Part VII. Unless Hounslow had done something odd, emergency transfer provisions would be under the allocation policy (unless I’m really missing something about the position in 2000), not homelessness.

But this would lend support to Hounslow’s position based on O’Rourke. Although the Court distinguishes it on the basis that O’Rourke concerned what became Part VII, the broader point of ‘a scheme for the provision of social housing’ would be still clearer for a Part VI transfer.

I’m not sure about the Court’s argument that the move would not necessarily be to ‘Council accommodation’, either. It would be accommodation arranged by the Council to effect a move, and as short term, would be interim before moving to a new secure tenancy.

The Court’s conclusion, dismissing the statutory provision as ‘whatever’, is weak rhetoric, I think.

But that said, an extension of a duty of care to vulnerable adults as well as children in respect of the social services function seems less controversial. In fact, incremental. Which presents an odd position - if one accepts a duty of care by social services, the failure to move the Claimants was arguably down to the Housing Dept. Should social services be excused a breach of duty because the housing dept can’t have a private law duty of care and social services had no statutory power to effect a transfer themselves? The Court’s refusal to take the Defendant as separate entities (social services/housing), which is surely right, is irreconcilable with that conclusion.

Is there not an argument that, even if the emergency transfer powers are governed by Part VI (or even Part VII) HA, this is merely an enabling power and that the exercise of discretion - which is always necessarily in relation to specific circumstances - does attract a potential duty of care, precisely because it is not a ‘policy’ decision, but based on the particular danger to the tenant - i.e. the decision is (or should be) made on the basis of the tenant’s safety.

In the end, as far as I can tell, this is what the Court is putting forward in this case. At least, I think it is. I may well change my take on this case when I have had time to digest it.

This is going to the Court of Appeal, of course, and it is going to be a very difficult argument, on both sides.

Congratulations to Leigh Day & Co. and Counsels Elizabeth-Anne Gumbel QC & Henry Witcomb on bringing this one.

Unilateral tenancy variation

Published
by
NL
on 9 June 2008
in Housing law
. 3 Comments

Governors of the Peabody Trust v Reeve (Times report)

Registered Social landlords cannot vary tenancy agreements unilaterally, save for rent changes. Any other variation of terms requires consent of both parties in writing.

Unlike local authorities, registered social landlords such as the Peabody Trust ceased to enjoy the ability to vary tenancy agreements in accordance with section 103 of the 1985 Act after the enactment of the Housing Act 1988.

Even if it was possible under s.103, then it wouldn’t be binding under regulation 8 of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations (SI 1999 No 2083).