Archive for December, 2006

Law Search now Beta 0.1

It is an ongoing process, but I think Law Search has reached Beta status, just, and has thus been promoted to the sidebar.

law search

The custom specialist search, via Google co-op, prioritises results from listed sites, but includes general search results. The listed sites aim to cover freely available resources for statute, case law, commentary, reports, blogs and other resources for UK, particularly English, law. Subscription based and limited access sites are not included.

My grateful thanks go to Delia Venables for collating resources and most particularly to Nick Holmes of Binary Law and Infolaw for advice and assistance beyond the call of duty.

Nick Holmes has set up specialist custom search engines for particular areas (eg, Blawgs, Legislation, Case law). I would be very interested in any comments people might have on the relative utility of a ‘general’ law custom search and the ‘focused’ custom searches. I use both, but my search needs only cover certain areas, so I cannot be clear about effectiveness. If it turns out that delimited specialist searches are more useful, I’ll give this CSE a rethink.

What do we do with a problem like Ground 8?

To those not acquainted with housing law, Ground 8 is one of the mandatory grounds for possession of an assured tenancy listed in Housing Act 1988 Schedule 2. It forms one of the major differences between an assured tenancy (typically Housing Association/Registered Social Landlord) and a secure tenancy (typically Local Authority). As the wholesale transfers of local authority housing stock and tenancies to Housing Associations continue, not wholly uncontested, these differences become increasingly significant.

Ground 8 works quite simply. For the average weekly tenancy, it goes like this: 8 weeks rent arrears at the the time of the service of the Notice Seeking Possession and 8 weeks rent arrears at the date of the hearing of the claim and outright possession must be granted. Note those two dates. It does not mean a continuous period of arrears of 8 weeks or more. One can have entirely paid off arrears and then accrued a furhter 8 weeks, it doesn’t matter.

In dealing with secure tenants facing a possession claim for rent arrears, the Court has an extensive discretion as to whether possession is granted and if so, whether it is postponed. The Court will typically consider the arrears history and any reasons for the arrears, such as difficulties with housing benefit (which are frequent). None of this can be considered in a claim for possession on Ground 8. If the conditions are met, outright possession is mandatory and eviction usually follows promptly.

Some Housing Associations claim that they rarely use Ground 8, relying instead on discretionary Grounds, others claim that they use Ground 8 only ‘in extremis’. All point out that they have a duty to recover rent (although only rarely is any rent actually recovered this way). However, there are still many claims being made, in my anecdotal experience.

Nobody, except the Housing Associations, likes Ground 8. The Courts tend to dislike the restriction on their discretion, particularly when they are very familiar with housing benefit screw-ups. I have heard tales of the Court, where there is any doubt at all that the Notice Seeking Possession was received by the tenant, insisting that the HA witness to service is produced, which they often can’t do and this will, in any case, adjourn matters unless by some miracle, the housing officer is present.

Housing lawyers don’t like it for obvious reasons. So what, if anything can be done in the face of a Ground 8 claim?

Where the Order has been made, are there any grounds to set it aside? The usual ones of non-attendance for good reason and a defence usually won’t work, (but just might for disrepair?). However, I have successfully obtained set asides on the basis of oppression and on the basis that the defendant was a patient in terms of CPR 21.2 so that a litigation friend should have been appointed by the Claimant.

If there is the basis for a disrepair counterclaim, this might work. I haven’t personally run one, but it ought to mean that the amount of the arrears is disputed.

Also check whether the amount of arrears can be disputed, post Riverside Housing Association Ltd v White [2005] EWCA. Have rent increases been correctly levied? [Edit 05/07. The House of Lords has overturned the Court of Appeal judgment. Although the matter turns on the facts of Riverside, this downgrades a challenge on these grounds].

The other challenges are purely procedural. Have the technicalities, such as service, been complied with?

On these lines, a new and interesting prospect is presented by the introduction of the Pre-Action Protocol for rent arrears possession claims. A failure to comply with the protocol, where the claim is brought on anything other than solely mandatory grounds, means the Court can adjourn, strike out or dismiss claims. Claims on Ground 8 typically, though not always, are also made on Ground 10 and 11, which are discretionary grounds, thus opening up the argument that the Claimant has failed to comply with the Pre-Action Protocol and the claim should be dismissed or struck out. This won’t work on a solely Ground 8 Claim, but these are rarely made because of the arrears are reduced below 8 weeks (for a weekly rent), then the whole claim fails.

In my anecdotal experience, Housing Associations have been very poor at following the Protocol since it was introduced at the beginning of October 2006. This one could well be worth considering.

The fact remains that Ground 8 claims are difficult to defend (and for that reason it can be tricky to get funding for a defence). As the use of the ground is often deeply unfair to a tenant who has been trying to get their housing benefit sorted out (and this can take months), it makes an assured tenancy considerably less safe than a secure one.

And a happy christmas to me.

Unlike Charon QC or even Geeklawyer, I have been away doing the christmas necessaries, and actually very pleasant they were too.

On my return today, I find that to my surprise and delight, I have received a Blawg Review Award for 2006. Hurrah and indeed whoopee. As a newcomer of 6 months or so, this is gratifying. It has also been picked up by the Self Help Law ExPress, which is a blawg I shall be following from now on.

Granted, this is an award for ‘paralegal blawg of 2006′. which is lovely, but feels a little like coming first in a category of, well, several at best.

On the other hand, this is an effectively USAian award and mine and Human Law (as best British Blawg) were, as far as I can see, the only British blawgs, so there is quite some pride in grabbing an international category, however small.

And to Public Defender Stuff, who rightly objected to the absence of a public defender category but cited Nearly Legal as one extreme of the listings, I would say that I might not do criminal work, but this blog is entirely fixated on legal aid public defence work in housing. It is what I do, to paraphrase the Bishop of Southwark. I’m just not USAian.

And to Geeklawyer, who is, as we all know obsessed with awards, may I just say Ppphhtt. Oh and a post of mine is currently a ‘must read’ at techlaw advisor. What can I say? It is not just the Bar that can do shameless self-promotion.

Coming next - Some seriously speculative housing law.

We’re not in Kensal Rise anymore, Toto.

With thanks to Charon QC for the link, an utterly unseasonal opportunity for schadenfreude (assuming it is genuine) is here, courtesy of Liadnan.

Normally, those of us in legal aid housing law can be expected to be sympathetic to tales of sudden homelessness (well, losing at least one home). I’m not sure that hysterical laughter counts as sympathy.

Equitable interests and right to buy discounts

A fairly abstruse discussion after the recent fun and games, but, to someone like me who was intrigued and amused while studying equity, an enjoyable one.

A recent case involved the client’s equitable interest in an ex-council house, formally purchased by the tenants, but the client stood guarantor and paid over half the mortgage, following an oral agreement that all three would ’share’ the ownership.

The other side had denied any agreement and claimed the client was paying rent, but the evidence was strong enough for an agreement to be inferred by the Court in a Lloyd’s Bank type 2 form, although not for the 50/50 that our client maintained. So, a constructive trust/proprietary estoppel (Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546 having effectively conflated the two).

The question then was the apportionment of interest. The facts as found by the Court were that our client had paid something like 70% of the mortgage, and that the other side had attracted a discount of some 45% on the purchase price as a result of their tenancy on the right to buy. There were other payments and expenses for both sides, but no deposit.

Naturally, the other side argued for the 45% as their contribution, so that any share to our client would have to be in the remaining 55% (so say 22.5% max). They relied mainly on a reading of Springette v Defoe [1992] 2 FLR 388 where the RTB discount was treated as a fixed contribution. Unfortunately for them, the issue of the discount was agreed by the parties rather than argued at the Court of Appeal.

We rehearsed the recent history from Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 through Oxley v Hiscock. In each case, the Court had taken the position that although it was entitled to consider the RTB discount as a contribution, where there was no express agreement between the parties as to share, the contribution was part of a whole course of dealing and it was this that the Court should consider.

Our argument was that each of these cases was a resulting trust case, hinging on intial contribution to purchase. So if the discount was a factor but not a fixed point in these cases, then it should be even less of a weight in a constructive trust case, based on a post purchase course of dealing (on both sides).

The Court seemed to largely accept this, pointing out that the discount would have been valueless without our client enabling the mortgage. In the judgement, the Court firmly declared that it was not bound in the way it should consider the discount, that its governing principle was that of equity and that the discount formed a part of a consideration of all the circumstances or ‘the whole course of dealing’. Following Oxley, of course, but a clear statement of equitable principle in constructive trust

Our client got 40%, which seemed about right to me on the facts. The client had had benefits in terms of living expenses, Council tax and so on that were also weighed.

Some feel there is a danger in not having the discount as a fixed consideration. Certainly, one can imagine situations - say where that has been one partner’s sole contribution because that was all they had - where it would seem unfair for the discount to be, erm, discounted. But, as the Court stressed here, equity is the governing principle, fairness in the circumstances, and that seems to me to be right, as those circumstances can vary from utter shams to the completely deserving.

Nothing earth shaking then, but a clear statement of position. It was also interesting to see this worked out in a non-marital/partnership situation.

There was an intriguing second string argument on subrogation, should constructive trust fail, but I need to brush up on the details before I can render it.

Botox and peel.

I have had a bit of a re-design. I think the look is better and hopefully easier to use.

It took me a bit further into the bowels of Wordpress than I was planning, but it seems to be running fairly well. Any problems, please let me know.